Making State Law in Federal Court
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Abstract: We know from Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins that unless the Constitution
or a federal statute provides the rule of decision in federal court, state law does.
Contrary to the assumption of several recent commentators, however, Erie itself
does not tell the federal court how to ascertain what is the law of the state, and
the refrain that federal courts are to predict what the state supreme court would
decide not only proves unhelpful upon examination, but also has tended to
confuse the courts themselves in recent years. Yet federal courts routinely face
questions of state law that admit of no clear answer under state precedents.
In this Article, I argue that federal courts must exercise their own independent
judgment in resolving unsettled state-law issues according to their own
calculations of best outcomes, and I explain why this approach comports with
the principles of Erie and its progeny. Two other possible positions are flawed:
one, which has gained currency in the last decade, is that federal courts are
incompetent to opine on unsettled state-law issues and should therefore employ
every artifice to avoid doing so, and the other, which derives from academic
work of two decades earlier, suggests that federal courts have superior technical
competence and should therefore instruct state courts regarding the proper
resolution of unsettled state-law issues. My approach also clarifies the meaning
of the “prediction of state law” metaphor and answers the troublesome question
of the proper weight for district courts to accord federal appellate predictions.

Disputes litigated in federal court frequently must be decided at least in part according to
state law. But the precise content of the state law at issue is not always clear. Sometimes state
courts have not addressed the issue to be decided in federal court. Other times state courts have
addressed the issue but have reached contradictory conclusions. Uncertainty can result from
other postures as well; for example, parties might agree that a certain principle of state law
applies to their case, but disagree as to how that principle should be applied to the facts at hand.
How should a federal court ascertain and apply state law in these circumstances? Civil
procedure mavens know that the task of the federal court is to predict how the state supreme
court would decide the issue. Upon examination, however, this response answers very little. To
which sources should a federal court turn to ascertain state law? Does legal authority outside the
sources of state law constrain how the federal court understands the sources themselves? If
sources of state law point in opposite directions, how should the federal court choose among
them?
The federal appellate courts have proposed widely divergent instructions, and the few
commentators who have addressed this ubiquitous problem have offered similarly varying
visions of the principles at stake. Many courts have tried to deny the relevance of their own
judgment, instead reciting, for example, that they should observe doctrinal trends in the state law,
or else that they should do the opposite, treating state law as static. Other courts have sought to
restrict liability. Still others think that whenever state law is unclear, they should follow the
plurality approach of other jurisdictions that have addressed the issues. Several commentators
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have argued that federal courts’ engagement with unsettled state law is problematic for a number
of reasons, including constitutional ones. Other arguments, however, might be advanced that
federal courts possess superior technical competence and that they can therefore resolve
confusion among state courts. Upon close examination, all of these arguments are flawed.
My purpose in this Article is to illuminate these questions and to propose, broadly, an
answer. I argue that federal courts can neither escape unsettled state law nor decide state-law
questions in ways that are substantively correct. Instead, I think that the federal court should
consider various sources of state law—primarily the opinions of state courts—as data and state
law as the function that connects them. Where no binding federal precedent has already
configured the data in question, the judgment as to how they ought to be connected is the federal
court’s alone, and it should exercise that judgment according to its own view of the best result.
This approach makes the best sense of the Supreme Court’s governing case law on unsettled
state law in federal court.
Before reaching the merits, however, one must understand the problem. I therefore
begin, in Part I, by identifying the issues raised by presence of unsettled state law in federal
court. This Part explains why state law arises in federal court and why that presence is
problematic for federal courts. It then provides the texture of the varying types of problems that
state law may pose in federal court before explaining why one possible solution to those
problems, certification, is impractical.
Next, Part II details what the United States Supreme Court and the United States Courts
of Appeals have said about the task of federal courts in ascertaining and applying state law. This
Part may serve as a resource for current federal courts regarding the history and state of the law,
in addition to setting the stage for grappling with the fundamental question.
Part III proceeds to address directly that fundamental issue, not fully resolved by current
explication in cases and commentary, of how a federal court ought to approach the task of
ascertaining and applying unsettled state law. I set forth two basic, opposed positions that might
be or have been advanced: first, federal courts have superior institutional competence and should
therefore instruct state courts regarding the proper resolution of unsettled state-law issues;
second, federal courts are incompetent to opine on unsettled state-law issues and should therefore
employ every artifice to avoid doing so. Part III also explains why these positions are untenable.
I then elaborate my own view—that federal courts must exercise their own independent
judgment in resolving state-law issues according to their own calculations of best outcomes—
and explain why it best comports with the first principles embodied in the Supreme Court’s
decisions. Understanding this approach also enables resolution of certain other nettlesome
problems, such as the meaning of “prediction” of state law and the proper weight for district
courts to accord federal appellate predictions.
I. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM OF STATE LAW IN FEDERAL COURT
A glance at the sources of federal court jurisdiction reveals the avenues through which
state law enters federal court.1 District courts have federal question jurisdiction to hear cases that
1

The list of jurisdictional statutes in this paragraph is not exhaustive, however. Indeed, the litigation of adversary
proceedings in bankruptcy is increasingly a forum for the federal exposition of unsettled state law. See infra notes
32 & 33 and accompanying text. District courts have original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction over disputes arising
under or related to the Bankruptcy Code. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).
State law can sneak into federal court in less expected places as well. The Tenth Circuit recently held that
it was obliged to interpret an arguably ambiguous state statute in order to decide the validity of a traffic stop in a
federal criminal case. United States v. DeGasso, 369 F.3d 1139, 1145-46 (10th Cir. 2004). The dissenting judge in
DeGasso argued that the federal court should not have attempted this task in a federal criminal case because it was
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arise under the Constitution or federal laws.2 In addition, they have diversity jurisdiction to hear
disputes between parties from different states when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.3
Finally, Congress has authorized district courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state
law claims that are related to other claims that confer one of the other types of jurisdiction.4 A
federal court must apply the appropriate state law to claims that are before it pursuant to diversity
or supplemental jurisdiction. That this should be the case may seem self-evident, but before
1938 it was not.
A. Understanding Erie
Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, federal courts sitting in diversity
decided cases with reference to their own views about the law, unless the relevant state had
passed a statute that spoke directly to the issue at hand. This is because legal thinking at that
time conceptualized the common law as a single entity. This categorical system was premised
on a number of allegedly pre-political foundational concepts, such as “liberty” and “property,”
from which an expanding logic of analogy spread ineluctably to reach the correct resolution of
any particular case. Thus, lawyers imagined that state courts in different states adjudicating
matters of contract law were in fact applying the same, general law of contracts. Justice
Holmes’s criticism of this “fallacy” well captures the concept:
Therefore I think it proper to state what I think the fallacy is.—The often repeated
proposition of this and the lower Courts is that the parties are entitled to an
independent judgment on matters of general law. By that phrase is meant matters
that are not governed by any law of the United States or by any statute of the
State—matters that in States other than Louisiana are governed in most respects
by what is called the common law. It is through this phrase that what I think the
fallacy comes in.
Books written about any branch of the common law treat it as a unit, cite
cases from this Court, from the Circuit Courts of Appeal, from the State Courts,
from England and the Colonies of England indiscriminately, and criticise them as
right or wrong according to the writer’s notions of a single theory. It is very hard
to resist the impression that there is one august corpus, to understand which
clearly is the only task of any Court concerned. If there were such a
transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it
unless and until changed by statute, the Courts of the United States might be right
in using their independent judgment as to what it was.5
Though on its face neither liberal nor conservative, such classical legal thought provided
the intellectual structure for many reactionary decisions by the Supreme Court at the turn of the
inconsistent with due process. See id. at 1151, 1154-55 (Baldock, J., dissenting). Assessing whether the majority or
the dissent has the better view is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this Article.
2
28 U.S.C. § 1331. Even federal questions often require the determination of state law for their resolution. For
example, the procedural component of the Due Process Clause protects entitlements that are created by state law, so
due-process claims predicated on state-law entitlements may turn on deciphering what, exactly, state law provides.
Last Term, the Supreme Court concerned itself with such a question of Colorado law in Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005).
3
28 U.S.C. § 1332.
4
28 U.S.C. § 1367.
5
Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (Holmes,
J., dissenting); see also Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 399 (Field, J., dissenting) (“I cannot
assent to the doctrine that there is an atmosphere of general law floating about all the States, not belonging to any of
them….”).
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century,6 and these decisions provided the impetus for progressive thinkers to undermine the
hegemony of classical legal thought.7 Critical doctrinal writers, philosophers, institutional
economists, and empiricists all contributed to the intellectual movement of legal realism. By the
1930s, legal realists had effected a paradigm shift in legal thought. Lawyers no longer believed
that a single common law existed separate from the courts that expounded on it. Instead, they
recognized that law is, ultimately, what courts say in fact. Thus, by 1938, it no longer made
conceptual sense for a federal court sitting in diversity to decline to consider a state law rule of
decision on the rationale that, unless contravened by a specific state statute, the common law is
what it is.
This change helps to explain the Supreme Court’s 1938 decision in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins.8 The defendant in that case contended that Pennsylvania law provided the rule of
decision, but the district court disagreed, since the rule at issue was a matter of common law.
After the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court, the Supreme Court
reversed. First, it considered the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, which provided, “The laws of
the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of United States otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of
the United States, in cases where they apply.”9 The Court held that the Act’s reference to “laws
of the several States” included not only the statutes passed by the states’ legislatures but also the
common law as articulated by the states’ courts.
Second, the Court held the requirement that federal courts apply state substantive law to
all claims that do not arise under federal law is a constitutional requirement. Justice Brandeis
explained, “There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare
substantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or
‘general,’ be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution
purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.”10 For this reason, the Court declared
that “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to
be applied in any case is the law of the State.”11 It added, finally, that “whether the law of the
state shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a
matter of federal concern.”12

6

See generally ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH,
1887-1895 (Torchbook 1976) (1960) (reciting in detail a progressive critique of turn-of-the-century jurisprudence).
7
See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870 – 1960: THE CRISIS OF
LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992); BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE
AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998).
8
304 U.S. 64 (1938). I say “helps to explain,” rather than “explains,” deliberately. Professors Goldsmith and Walt
have argued that extant legal historical evidence does not support the proposition that the turn to legal positivism or
legal realism caused the result of Erie in any strong sense. See Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the
Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV. 673 (1998). Indeed, one can find examples in the pre-Erie case law
of federal courts behaving in a much more nuanced manner than my overview here might suggest. What Professors
Goldsmith’s and Walt’s article fails to acknowledge, however, is the basic point, entirely consistent with the sort of
nuance one can easily uncover, that under a classical conception of law, there is no dissonance between a federal
court applying its own “general” notions of the common law in place of state rules of decision because,
axiomatically, the two cannot differ.
9
Erie, 304 U.S. at 71 (quoting Federal Judiciary Act).
10
Id. at 78.
11
Id.
12
Id.
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It is worth pausing to weigh in on the precise holding of Erie. Its conclusion on statutory
construction was that Congress had mandated that federal courts apply state substantive law
unless a federal question was at issue. Its constitutional conclusion was that, even had Congress
not mandated such a rule, the Constitution granted federal courts no particular common
lawmaking power over states. Once one recognizes that law does not exist apart from the courts
that pronounce it, these conclusions are uncontroversial.13
Because of Erie’s broad language and central place in American constitutional law,
however, overstating its holding is easy. Congress may not have the power simply to authorize
federal courts to develop a single common law, but it certainly has the power under the
Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses to authorize federal courts to develop federal
common law in particular areas.14 Consider, for example, ERISA, where Congress has
preempted state law that regulates insurance and authorized federal courts to craft a body of
federal common law to flesh out the statute.15 The constitutional rule of Erie, then, is that absent
authorization from Congress,16 federal courts cannot fashion common law rules of decision.
Understating Erie’s holding can also be tempting, however, particularly in dealing with
the instant subject. Specifically, as we will see,17 courts and commentators sometimes
conceptualize Erie as a straightforward instruction to federal courts that their task in applying
state law is to make a political science-like or sociological guess as to what a state’s supreme
court would decide. One scholar, for example, recently claimed that Erie “mandated that a
federal court faced with questions of state law should endeavor to resolve those questions as it
believes that the high court of the state whose law is in question would resolve them.”18
Following from this premise, he argued that federal appellate courts should give deference to
13

Nevertheless, the precise textual basis for Erie’s constitutional holding has generated academic controversy. See,
e.g., John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974).
14
I recognize that there is some tension between this statement and the Court’s comment in Erie that “Congress has
no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or
‘general,’ be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts.” 304 U.S. at 78. But the answer is to take the latter
statement at face value. The Constitution does not contain a clause authorizing Congress to declare common-law
rules, but it does have clauses authorizing Congress to legislate matters that affect interstate commerce and that are
necessary and proper ways to implement those powers.
15
See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (“[W]e have held that courts are to develop a
‘federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans.’”) (citation omitted); Weiner, D.P.M.
v. Klais & Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 92 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Courts have recognized that Congress intended for the
judiciary to develop and apply a federal common law to actions premised on the contractual obligations created by
ERISA plans. . . . However, federal common law is developed under ERISA only in those instances in which ERISA
is silent or ambiguous.”).
16
Of course, simply because no clause in the Constitution purported to grant Congress the power to declare
substantive common-law rules of decision does not, by itself, explain why federal courts are prohibited from doing
so. The necessary additional explanation is, perhaps, less than obvious to the extent that it is not initially intuitive.
One explanation is that the Constitution makes the federal government one of limited powers, so we should not
assume that the courts have powers that are not explicitly mentioned. Another concerns the separation of powers
inherent in the constitutional structure; if Congress is without power to declare a law of general application, federal
courts do not have any greater lawmaking authority. And to the extent that Congress does have such power under
certain circumstances (for example, where the law is a regulation of interstate commerce), Congress can act only in
specified ways—for example, through bicameralism and presentment. These procedural safeguards would be
circumvented if federal courts were able to determine simultaneously that federal lawmaking were permissible and
also make the law.
17
See infra Part III.C.5.a.
18
Jonathan Remy Nash, Resuscitating Deference to Lower Federal Court Judges’ Interpretations of State Law, 77 S.
CAL. L. REV. 975, 978 (2004).
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federal trial courts’ declarations of state law because federal trial courts are more likely to be
able to intuit how the state supreme court would opine in the future.
But the Court simply made no such pronouncement in Erie. It said that “the law to be
applied in any case is the law of the State,” and it said that a state supreme court was capable of
setting forth that law in a decision. The Court in Erie did not, however, state that the what a state
supreme court will in fact decide at some future time constitutes “the law of the State” at present,
nor did it tell federal courts to endeavor to resolve state-law questions as it believes the state
supreme court would.19
B. How Does Ascertaining State Law Pose a Problem?
Having contextualized Erie, its paradoxical effect becomes apparent. Understanding that
common law is what courts say and not some brooding omnipresence, the Court in Erie required
federal courts to apply the law of the relevant state when that law provides the applicable rule of
decision. In practice, then, the federal court must ascertain “the law” of the relevant state. This
very undertaking presumes that the state’s law is out there, somewhere, and that it is
discoverable. The effect is arguably paradoxical because, in turning away from the idea that the
common law exists as an entity apart from the courts that announce it, Erie instructs federal
courts to treat the common law in precisely this manner—that is, as an entity that exists and can
be discovered—albeit at a statewide level, instead of a universal one.
One might sensibly object at this point that the preceding discussion makes much ado
about nothing. After all, a federal district court does not invent federal law from whole cloth. It
researches precedent and attempts to determine the extent to which applicable precedent controls
the particular facts of the case before it, or at least the direction to which such precedent points.
And it proceeds in the same manner when it must rule on a question of state law. Thus, the
argument goes, there is no functional difference between the determination and application of
state and federal law in federal court.
This objection is roughly correct,20 but it proves too little. The objection is only roughly
correct on its own terms because a federal district court seeking to ascertain federal law knows to
look to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and then the decisions of the United
States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the district court sits.21 Only when these two
sources do not determine the outcome of the federal question in the district court will that court
look for guidance—not binding authority—to the opinions of other courts of appeals and district
courts. The appropriate sources of state law are not so clear cut.22
The objection proves too little because the federal court may ascertain and apply federal
precedent with the twin confidences that, first, whatever it decides is the law until changed by the
court of appeals and, second, a disappointed litigant may appeal the decision to the court of
appeals and then to the Supreme Court, so eventually the final decision will be an authoritative
statement of federal law. When the same federal court determines and applies state law, it can
have neither confidence. Although its decision “is the law” in the sense that it binds the
litigating parties, it is not straightforwardly the law of the state because the federal court is not
19

Professor Michael C. Dorf has reached the same conclusion. See Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of
Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 709 (1995) (“The Erie Court takes federal judges as its audience and instructs them to
apply state, rather than federal, law in diversity cases. But it says almost nothing about how to ascertain state law.”).
20
See infra Part III.C.3.
21
This proposition is so well ingrained that it is not remotely controversial. Upon closer inspection, however, it is
not obvious. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV.
817 (1994).
22
See infra Part II.B.
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authorized to make state common law. Nor, indeed, is any court in the chain of appeals so
authorized. Thus, though from the most extremely realist perspective, a federal court
determining state law might in fact be doing the same thing it does in determining federal law,
the two determinations and their applications are of quite different kinds.
C. Examples of State Law in Federal Court
Upon which types of state law questions are federal courts routinely required to pass?
Answering this question is important in order both to understand the difficulty faced by federal
courts in addressing issues of state law and to evaluate and apply the rules that govern such
practice. I do not mean to answer the question by any statistical analysis. Instead, my goal here
is to provide some texture to the nature of troubling state-law questions that arise in federal
court.
In doing so, I hope that three points become apparent. The first is that hard state-law
issues present themselves from all directions: diversity and supplemental jurisdiction, as well as
federal questions that necessarily incorporate state law. Second, the nature of the difficulty
posed varies. State authorities may directly conflict; they may provide seemingly inconsistent,
or at least inconclusive, guidance as to the application of a legal standard upon which all agree;
they might articulate the standard in question in slightly different, if not necessarily conflicting,
ways; there might be no state authority on a particular point at all. Third, another problem
hovers over all of these: the proper regard for federal appellate precedent on specific state-law
issues that are otherwise unclear.
One situation that is easy to identify as a problem for federal courts is where intermediate
state appellate courts directly conflict on a point of legal doctrine. Such conflict may be explicit,
or different lines of conflicting state authority might exist alongside each other without
recognition of the split. In the first half of this decade, for example, the Southern District of
Ohio was frequently faced with a case of explicit state-law conflict that arose in federal court
under federal question jurisdiction. A plaintiff would bring suit against her former employer
under federal civil rights laws, and the defendant would respond by seeking to compel arbitration
pursuant to an agreement that the former employee had signed. The Federal Arbitration Act tells
courts to enforce valid agreements to arbitrate, even when jurisdiction is premised on civil rights
laws, but validity is determined according to state law. Throughout the 1990s and into the first
few years of this decade, Ohio intermediate appellate courts were in direct conflict as to whether
the “continued employment” of an at-will employee constituted consideration for an employee’s
mid-employment agreement to a new term imposed by her employer,23 such that the arbitration
agreement was valid and enforceable. Because large companies increasingly force their
employees to sign arbitration agreements, federal courts were frequently forced to wrestle with
this question in precisely this posture,24 although the doctrinal split could just as easily rear its
head in a diversity suit to enforce a covenant not to compete25—at least until 2004, when the
Ohio Supreme Court weighed in.26
A second type of state law question concerns understanding the sort of evidence that
satisfies a particular legal standard. For example, a Tennessee statute forbids a physician from
23

Compare Prinz Office Equipment Co. v. Pesko, No. 14155, 1990 Ohio App. Lexis 367, at *12 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan.
31, 1990) (“Ohio does not recognize continued employment as valid consideration.”), with Fin. Dimensions, Inc. v.
Zifer, No. C-980960, 1999 Ohio App. Lexis 5879, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1999) (holding that “continued
employment” is valid consideration).
24
E.g., Raasch v. NCR Corp., 254 F. Supp. 2d 847, 863 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
25
E.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Kitsonas, 118 F. Supp. 2d 848, 851 (S.D. Ohio 2000).
26
I discuss this doctrinal issue and the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in greater detail in Part III.A., infra.
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offering expert testimony in a medical malpractice case unless he or she has knowledge of “the
recognized standard of acceptable professional practice in the profession and specialty thereof, if
any, that the defendant practices in the community in which the defendant practices or in a
similar community at the time the alleged injury…occurred.”27 One Tennessee appellate court
held that a proposed expert did not satisfy this standard where he opined that the standard of care
in Jackson, Tennessee was effectively a national standard.28 Another Tennessee appellate court
held that a proposed expert did satisfy this standard where he testified that Memphis, Tennessee
and Lexington, Kentucky were similar communities because both had regional medical centers.29
With these two precedents serving as the only state authority on point, how should a federal
court sitting in diversity in Tennessee rule when a proposed expert opines that he knows the
relevant standard of care because Nashville, Tennessee and St. Louis, Missouri are both regional
medical centers and because the applicable standard of care is a national one? Recognizing the
Erie issues at stake, the Sixth Circuit had no particularly cogent answer to this question when
confronted with it.30
Although I have described this second sort of case in terms of the problem of recognizing
sufficient evidence, the difficulty such a case poses for federal district courts is roughly
analogous to that posed by any case that requires application of a general and undisputed rule,
phrased at a high level of generality, to particular facts.31 The state supreme court may not have
taken a sufficient number of cases to establish the margins of tolerable diversity in any easily
discernible way. At the same time, state intermediate appellate courts may seem to establish
quite divergent margins, or they may develop different legal sub-rules to guide heuristically the
major legal determination.
Novel, rather than simply unsettled, issues of state law may also arise in federal contexts.
For example, substantial attention has recently been devoted to litigating whether a particular
state would consider a corporation to be “injured” by the fraudulent prolongation of its existence
where the corporation was already insolvent before any fraudulent activity took place. The Third
Circuit answered the question affirmatively where Pennsylvania law was concerned, even though
it recognized that no Pennsylvania court—nor even any federal court opining on Pennsylvania
law—had addressed the question.32 Other federal courts have subsequently opined on the law of
other states with respect to “deepening insolvency.”33 The issue has arisen almost exclusively in
federal bankruptcy court, and each federal court that weighs in has written effectively on a blank
slate insofar as guiding state authority is concerned.
Federal courts trying to apply unsettled state law must also sometimes struggle with
another problem, the proper weight to be accorded to earlier opinions on the state-law issue by
the federal circuit court of appeals. This problem afflicts both district courts and circuit courts,
the former because they are inferior courts and the latter because of the rule to which all federal
27

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115(a)(1).
Mabon v. Jackson-Madison County Gen. Hosp., 968 S.W.2d 826, 830 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
29
Wilson v. Patterson, 73 S.W.3d 95, 105 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
30
Sommer v. Davis, 317 F.3d 686, 694-95 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that neither the “possibility” that “the standard of
care for surgery involving spinal fusion is in fact uniform nationwide” nor the federal court’s “policy views of
medical malpractice litigation control this case,” citing Erie, and deferring to the district court under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard).
31
See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1186 (1989).
32
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., Inc., 267 F.3d 340, 349-50 (3d Cir. 2001).
33
E.g., In re Exide Techs., Inc., 299 B.R. 732, 751 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (“I must first determine whether a
deepening insolvency claim is cognizable under Delaware law.”).
28
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circuit courts adhere that one panel may not overrule an earlier one.34 Does a federal circuit
court precedent on a matter of state law control subsequent federal cases faced with that statelaw issue? Does the answer to this question differ depending on whether the state courts have
addressed the question between the first and the second federal opinion?
One commentator has answered the first question in the negative, arguing that “district
court judges…must always look first at the most recent state pronouncements to decide a
diversity case, rather than relying on circuit court ‘precedent.’”35 According to this
commentator, “federal circuit court determinations of state law have no precedential value.”36
Federal district courts have generally not been this bold, although Judge Weinstein of the
Southern District of New York has opined in passing that “a decision by the Second Circuit is
not binding on this court in determining a question of state law.”37 On the other hand, in a recent
opinion for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Easterbrook vigorously insisted that by treating a prior
Seventh Circuit precedent on an issue of state law “as having no more than persuasive force, the
district court made a fundamental error. In a hierarchical system, decisions of a superior court
are authoritative on inferior courts.”38
Judge Easterbrook’s opinion is one of several recent federal appellate decisions that also
address the second question identified above: the effect of intervening state-court decisions.
According to the Seventh Circuit in that case, intervening decisions by state intermediate
appellate courts “assuredly…do not themselves liberate district judges from the force of our
decisions,” and should not cause the court of appeals to reconsider: “Instead of guessing over and
over, it is best to stick with one assessment until the state’s supreme court, which alone can end
the guessing game, does so.”39 The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, did reconsider its earlier decision
where intervening state appellate decisions had reached the contrary result, ultimately reaching
this contrary conclusion.40 Circuit court precedent dictated reconsideration under these
circumstances, all of which troubled Judge O’Scannlain sufficiently to concur separately. “I find
myself in the perplexing position,” he confessed, “of being bound by a precedent counseling that
I need not be bound by a precedent.”41
Clearly, the circuit courts themselves are confused as to the appropriate weight of their
own previous predictions of state law. This confusion compounds that inherent in the task itself.
34

On the point of obeisance by inferior federal courts, see Caminker, supra note 21, and authorities discussed
therein; with respect to one panel binding later ones, see, for example, Dingle v. Bioport Corp., 388 F.3d 209, 215
(6th Cir. 2004) (“A panel of this Court cannot overrule the decision of another panel. The prior decision remains
controlling authority unless an inconsistent decision of the United States Supreme Court requires modification of the
decision or this Court sitting en banc overrules the prior decision.”); Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due
Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1017-18 (2003) (“Litigants feel precedent’s preclusive effect most keenly in the
courts of appeals, which candidly describe their approach to stare decisis as ‘strict,’ ‘binding,’ and ‘rigid.’ This
rigidity comes largely from the rule, followed in every circuit, that one panel cannot overrule another.”) (footnote
omitted).
35
Note, Determination of State Law in Diversity Cases: Salve Regina College v. Russell, 105 HARV. L. REV. 309,
318 (1991).
36
Id.; see also Nikiforos Mathews, Circuit Court Erie Errors and the District Court’s Dilemma: From Roto-Lith and
the Mirror Image Rule to Octagon Gas and Asset Securitization, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 739 (1996) (advocating the
position that if a district court thinks that a federal appellate prediction of state law is wrong, the district court should
simply defy the appellate precedent).
37
In re E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 772 F. Supp. 1380, 1409 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1991).
38
Reiser v. Residential Funding Corp., 380 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2004).
39
Id.
40
In re Watts, 298 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2002).
41
Id. at 1083 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring).
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The state law to be applied in federal court is thus frequently unclear along one or more of
several directions.
D. Why Certification Is Not the Answer
In one thorough study of state law in federal courts, Professor Bradford R. Clark
concluded that the best way for federal courts to handle unsettled state law is to “employ a
presumption in favor of certifying unsettled questions of state law to state courts whenever state
law authorizes this procedure.”42 This refers to a process whereby a federal court can certify a
particular question of state law to the state’s highest court. Certification procedures are a matter
of state law. The vast majority of all states have a certification procedure, but each state’s
procedure differs slightly on such matters as which court (district or appellate or both) may
certify which questions (dispositive or not, no controlling precedent in supreme court or no
precedent at all) at which stage of proceedings to which court.
Professor Clark argues that employing a presumption in favor of certifying unsettled
questions of state law to state courts best captures the principles of Erie. First, certification
ensures that unsettled questions of state law will be decided by states, not the federal
government, thereby implementing what Professor Clark refers to as Erie’s principle of judicial
federalism. At the same time, it permits federal courts to exercise properly their jurisdiction over
cases that include state-law questions, rather than, for example, abstaining until the state-law
issues have been decided.
Certification has received a lot of attention from the bench, bar, and academy, but it does
not solve district courts’ problems of finding and applying state law.
1. Certification as a hindrance to processing cases
The strongest—and most practical—consideration counseling against routine certification
is the delay that it would add to federal court proceedings. One very important function of
federal district courts is to process cases. District judges recognize that although the litigants
before them want their cases decided correctly under the law, in large part they simply want the
cases to be decided. Indeed, Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explains that the
rules are designed to secure not only the “just” determination of every action, but also its
“speedy” determination.43
Although the proposition that district courts and litigants appearing before them are
highly concerned with the promptness of a decision is not readily provable with empirical data,
Congress’s enactment of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 does demonstrate its centrality.44
According to Senator Joseph Biden, one of the principal architects of the legislation, it was
designed to address “[c]ourt congestion[, which] has become pronounced, particularly for civil
cases, as crowded dockets and inefficient procedures combine to make litigation expensive and
delays lengthy.”45 Section 476 of the Act, for example, requires the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts to prepare a list every six months that reports to the public, among other
things, the number of motions that have been pending in each district court for longer than six
months and the number and names of cases that have not been terminated more than three years
after being filed.46
42

Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism After Erie,
145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1564 (1997).
43
FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules . . . shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.”).
44
28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994).
45
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Congress and the Courts: Our Mutual Obligation, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1285, 1286 (1994).
46
28 U.S.C. § 476.
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Certification substantially adds to the time necessary for a federal court to resolve
dispositive motions. A 1977 law review article fixed the additional time at, on average, fifteen
months.47 And although one commentator in 1994 reported that “the time required for a state
court to answer a certified question was approximately six to seven months,”48 the next year
another was able to cite cases in which state courts had taken “an inordinately long time to
answer questions”49—ranging from thirteen months to six years.50 Any of these figures,
however, represents a substantial amount of time in the life of a federal case. Indeed, the Sixth
Circuit stated as much in American Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Heimann, when it refused to
certify a question of state law to the Kentucky Supreme Court in consideration, in part, of “the
inevitable delay inherent in the certification process.”51 Concurring in Lehman Brothers v.
Schein, Justice Rehnquist similarly observed that certification “entails more delay and expense
than would an ordinary decision of the state question on the merits by a federal court.”52
Part of the problem with the added delay of certification is (1) the potential for greater
unfairness and (2) the removal of the case from the realities of why parties litigate. This was
eloquently expressed over forty years ago by Justice Douglas in his dissent in Clay v. Sun
Insurance Office Limited:
Some litigants have long purses. Many, however, can hardly afford one lawsuit,
let alone two. Shuttling the parties between state and federal tribunals is a sure
way of defeating the ends of justice. The pursuit of justice is not an academic
exercise. There are no foundations to finance the resolution of nice state law
questions involved in federal court litigation. The parties are entitled—absent
unique and rare situations—to adjudication of their rights in the tribunals which
Congress has empowered to act.53
The delay added by certification can, in other words, introduce or exacerbate an element of
unfairness in litigation if parties do not have equal financial resources to prosecute or defend the
claims at issue.54
Even where parties have roughly equal litigation resources, however, certification delay
can hinder settlement. As we know from a literature too voluminous to reproduce here in any
47

David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV. 317, 326-27 (1977)
(“my own calculations from a 1976 study indicate that it has taken an average of fifteen months from federal
certification to federal application of the state response”).
48
Geri J. Yonover, A Kinder, Gentler Erie: Reining in the Use of Certification, 47 ARK. L. REV. 305, 333 (1994)
(citing a study by the Federal Judicial Center).
49
Bruce M. Selya, Certified Madness: Ask a Silly Question . . ., 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 677, 681 (1995).
50
Id. at 681 n.18.
51
683 F.2d 999, 1002 (6th Cir. 1982).
52
416 U.S. 386, 394 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). In Lehman Brothers, a divided Second Circuit had reversed
the district court because it disagreed with the lower court’s interpretation of unsettled Florida law. The Supreme
Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded for reconsideration of the propriety of
certification under these circumstances. Justice Rehnquist agreed with this outcome, but concurred separately to
indicate that he did not think that certification was necessarily appropriate. On remand, the Second Circuit did
certify the state-law questions. Schein v. Chasen, 519 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1975).
53
363 U.S. 207, 228 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
54
Another potential unfairness may afflict out-of-state litigants, since the primary purpose of diversity jurisdiction is
to assure an out-of-state litigant that he or she will receive adjudication in a neutral forum, which necessarily
assumes that state courts may not treat out-of-state litigants fairly. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power
of Federal Courts to Certify Questions of State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672, 1740 (2003) (arguing that one
conception of certification “is inconsistent with the fundamental purpose of diversity jurisdiction, which is to afford
out-of-state residents the opportunity to have cases heard in a neutral forum”).
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detail, “most cases settle.”55 Justice Douglas’s dissent in Clay captures the idea that often parties
in federal court are far less concerned about the niceties of particular state-law doctrines than
they are about establishing the basic legal framework within which to conduct negotiations
aimed at resolving their dispute.56
Major information deficits—such as a reasonable assessment of the likelihood that a
dispositive motion will be granted in whole or in part—can prevent meaningful settlement
negotiations.57 Where (1) parties to a suit in federal court are willing or even eager to settle, (2)
a dispositive motion is pending, and (3) the motion depends at least in part on an unsettled issue
of state law, certifying the question to the appropriate state court is a major waste of the time of
the district court, the state court, and the parties, because the parties will settle as soon as the
information gap has closed, no matter who decides the unsettled question (state court or federal
court) and no matter which way it is decided.58 Routine certification is therefore impractical.
2. Other objections to certification
Routine certification is also objectionable from the perspective of the state court system.
Constantly answering questions certified from federal courts would likely overwhelm state
supreme courts. In one oft-cited opinion, then-District Judge Cabranes remarked that “[i]t would
impose an unreasonable and unnecessary burden on the Connecticut Supreme Court if the
certification process were to be invoked routinely whenever a federal court was presented with
an unsettled question of Connecticut law.”59
Apart from the potential for overburdening, there is often little reason to suspect that state
supreme courts would want to opine on much of the unsettled state law in federal court. The
purely doctrinal question whether continued employment constitutes sufficient consideration to
support an agreement to arbitrate or not to compete, for example, had occurred in any number of
cases in Ohio state court, but the Ohio Supreme Court declined to allow a discretionary appeal
on the issue for well over a decade after a split of authority arose.60 Recurring questions of state
law may remain unsettled because the state supreme court wants more lower courts to weigh in
on the issue before it wades into the fray.61 Or they may remain unsettled because they involve
applying a general rule to particular facts, as with the difficulty of evaluating whether a plaintiff
has presented sufficient evidence that there was a substantial certainty of injury at his workplace,
and the state high court does not want to spend its time defining the borders of the application of
a known rule. In either situation, we should ask why a state supreme court would prefer to
55

Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle:” Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 1339 (1994).
56
Cf. id. at 1341 (“In reality, most cases that enter the system are resolved short of full-dress adjudication by a
process of maneuver and bargaining ‘in the shadow of the law.’”).
57
See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to Trial?: An Empirical Study of Predictors of Failure to Settle, 49
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 336 (1999) (“[I]ncreased information about the judge’s decision-making would increase
the likelihood of settlement.”).
58
Cf. Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why Permit Non-party Involvement in
Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221 (1999) (lamenting this fact).
59
L. Cohen & Co., Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1419, 1423 (D. Conn. 1986).
60
E.g., Canter v. Tucker, 670 N.E.2d 1001 (Ohio 1996) (table decision) (refusing to allow a discretionary appeal in
a case that raised the question, identified the split of authority, and then decided that continued employment was
sufficient consideration).
61
The United States Supreme Court often appears to take this approach. See, e.g., Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. v.
Aguilar, 120 S. Ct. 2029, 2033 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“My colleagues are
perhaps dissuaded from granting certiorari by the paucity of lower court decisions addressing [the legal issue
presented].”).
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receive a question from a federal court when it could have, at least as easily, accepted the same
question from its own appellate courts.
This highlights one obvious reason why certification is not a panacea: the state supreme
court may refuse to answer the question certified.62 Another obvious problem deserving of
mention is that several states will receive certified questions only from federal appellate courts.63
District courts seeking answers to questions of unsettled state law from those states are therefore
on their own.
3. Highly political versus “common” questions in state law
In assessing the costs and benefits of certification, one should also consider the difference
between the types of cases used by Professor Clark to extol its virtues with the types of routinely
arising cases that call for federal courts to ascertain state law. He criticizes Bulloch v. United
States,64 for example, as a case in which the state’s power to decide its own law was usurped by
the federal court. In Bulloch, unmarried cohabitants sued the federal government for loss of
consortium in district court under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The government moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that New Jersey law controlled pursuant to the Act, and that,
under New Jersey law, only married people could sue for loss of consortium. Unable to find a
state court case that squarely addressed the issue, the district court ultimately decided that New
Jersey law permitted a claim for loss of consortium by unmarried cohabitants.65 A couple years
later, two New Jersey state courts did address the question in Bulloch and came to the opposite
conclusion.66 “In a case like Bulloch,” according to Professor Clark, “a federal court’s erroneous
prediction that the state’s highest court would recognize a cause of action for loss of consortium
on behalf of unmarried cohabitants raises serious judicial federalism concerns.”67
Whether cases like Bulloch do indeed raise such concerns is a question to which I shall
return in Part III. Here, however, what I want to draw attention to is how easy it is to recognize
that the unsettled state-law question in Bulloch involved competing, contentious, and public
political considerations. Whether unmarried cohabitants should be treated by courts in the same
manner as a married couple is a politically controversial issue. Legislatures at the state and
federal level have debated and sometimes passed statutes aimed to define and “protect” the legal
status of socially traditional marriage. Candidates for political office take public stands on issues
related to whether a married couple should be treated differently than unmarried cohabitants.
Campaigns focus on such issues.
In short, whether the law should treat unmarried cohabitants differently than a married
couple is a political hot-button issue. When a federal court addresses such an issue of unsettled
state law, it is easy enough in these instances to charge that the federal court is usurping the
state’s constitutional prerogative to shape its own policy. But what about the question whether a
promise must be “clear and unambiguous” in order to support a claim for promissory estoppel?68
62

See, e.g., Selya, supra note 49, at 681 & n.19 (listing cases in which the state supreme court refused to answer and
gave either no explanation or a terse one for its refusal).
63
E.g., TEX. R. APP. P. 58.1 (“The Supreme Court of Texas may answer questions of law certified to it by any
federal appellate court . . . .”) (emphasis added).
64
487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980).
65
Id. at 1079-80.
66
Childers v. Shannon, 444 A.2d 1141 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982); Leonardis v. Morton Chem. Co., 445 A.2d
45 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982).
67
Clark, supra note 42, at 1504.
68
Compare Hale v. Volunteers of Am., 816 N.E.2d 259, 270 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (requiring a promise to be “clear
and unambiguous in its terms” in order to state a claim for promissory estoppel), with Chrysalis Health Care, Inc. v.
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Candidates do not run on that issue, and it never makes the daily news. Although, upon
inspection, the issue may be said to have political aspects, one cannot maintain that addressing
the question is political in anything like the sense that the issue in Bulloch was.
Indeed, no citation to authority should be necessary for the proposition that the
percentage of cases in which a federal court is called upon to decide an unsettled matter of state
law involving a political hot-button issue is a tiny fraction of all of the times that the federal
court is confronted with a question of unsettled state law.69 Perhaps certification is appropriate
in that small number of cases. But that does not suggest the appropriateness of certification
otherwise.
In sum, routine certification is not the answer for determining unclear issues of state
70
law. Federal courts, at least most of the time, must do the work themselves. How?
II. THE STATE OF THE LAW REGARDING STATE LAW IN FEDERAL COURT
A. Instructions from the United States Supreme Court
Erie itself provided the first instruction: “And whether the law of the state shall be
declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of
federal concern.”71 One year after Erie, in a diversity case that could have been decided on the
basis of res judicata or the law-of-the-case doctrine, the Court reiterated that, where Texas law
provided the rule of decision, “[i]t was the duty of the federal court to apply the law of Texas as
declared by its highest court.”72 In another case, the Court cited this later case, Wichita Royalty
Brooks, 640 N.E.2d 915, 921 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1994) (omitting this requirement). Both courts cited Mers v. Dispatch
Printing Co., 483 N.E.2d 150, 154 (Ohio 1985), as authority in support of their respective formulations of the
standard.
69
But see Nash, supra note 54, at 1739 (asserting, also without citation, that “[t]he class of cases in which questions
require ‘significant policymaking discretion’ that might be ‘more appropriately left to the states’ is not small”). I do
not know whether Professor Nash includes in the category of questions that “require significant policymaking
discretion” those issues—such as the paradigm cases described in Part I.C. above—that are not facially “political,”
as that term is commonly understood.
70
In addition, one commentator has argued that “the certification procedure raises serious questions involving the
scope of federal jurisdiction and judicial power. . . . In fact, it is somewhat difficult to make the case that
certification does not exceed the constitutional and statutory limits on federal jurisdiction.” Nash, supra note 54, at
1675. To reach this conclusion, Professor Nash begins by asking whether certification is properly understood to
involve one case (proceeding in the federal court) or two (conceptualizing the proceedings in the responding state
court as a separate case). He terms these two possibilities as the unitary and binary conceptions of jurisdiction.
Although other legal postures are easily placed in one of these two categories, Nash argues that certain aspects of
certification support a unitary conception, while others support a binary conception. The problem with thinking of
certification under the unitary conception, according to Nash, is that it requires the responding state court to exercise
the federal judicial power, which, he believes, would be unconstitutional. The binary conception, on the other hand,
seems to be strongly in tension with the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction.
I do not share Professor Nash’s concern about the jurisdictional validity of certification. Judge Selya’s
analysis is entirely accurate, in my view:
When a question is certified, the responding court does not assume jurisdiction over the parties or
over the subject matter. It does not assume the power to adjudicate a dispute between the parties
or to enforce any judgment. Only the certifying court asserts real judicial power—“the right to
determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants”—over the parties.
Selya, supra note 49, at 685 (footnotes omitted). I therefore believe that a case in federal court in which a question
is certified is just that—a single case. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the state court is exercising the federal
judicial power when it responds to the question, because it has not assumed jurisdiction over the parties or the
subject matter. Under what authority the state court is proceeding is a matter of state concern. A state’s decision to
authorize its courts to issue advisory opinions is of no moment to the Constitution.
71
304 U.S. at 78.
72
Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat’l Bank of Wichita Falls, 306 U.S. 103, 107 (1939).
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Co., for the proposition that “the highest court of the state is the final arbiter of what is state law.
When it has spoken, its pronouncement is to be accepted by federal courts as defining state law
unless it has later given clear and persuasive indication that its pronouncement will be modified,
limited or restricted.”73
That is easy enough. As one very cautious commentator has summarized, where “the
highest court of the state whose substantive law is applicable has previously (and relatively
recently) determined the issue posed” in the federal action, then “it is generally agreed that the
federal judge who, under the Erie mandate, must apply state law, applies that law which has been
enunciated by the highest court of the state.”74 Neither Erie nor Wichita Royalty Co. says,
however, what the federal court is to do if the state supreme court has not spoken to the question
of state law at issue in the federal case.
In a series of cases from 1940-41, all of which appear in volume 311 of the United States
Reports, and have therefore sometimes been referred to simply as “311,”75 the Court did address
this issue by negative implication in the course of reversing five decisions by the courts of
appeals. Two of the cases, West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.76 and Stoner v. New
York Life Insurance Co.,77 did not squarely present problems of finding state law in the absence
of a state supreme court decision because in both cases, the legal question at issue had been
actually litigated by the same parties in state court before the federal litigation began. Doctrines
of issue or claim preclusion were therefore the appropriate vehicles for resolving the state-law
issues in the federal litigation. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court took both opportunities to opine
how, if preclusion doctrines were not applicable, the lower courts had erred in determining state
law.
In West, a decedent had willed his shares of AT&T stock to his widow for life, with the
remainder to his two sons from a previous marriage. The widow then presented the shares to
AT&T for transfer to her name only, and the company obliged. When the sons discovered this
transaction, they sued AT&T for damages in Ohio state court. The appellate court was the last
court to rule on the case in the state courts, and it decided, as a matter of statutory construction,
“that as a prerequisite to recovery for conversion of petitioners’ interest in the stock it was
necessary that respondent repudiate petitioners’ title and that the petitioners should allege and
prove that respondent had refused to recognize petitioners’ right in the stock.”78 Since no
demand or refusal had been proved, AT&T received judgment as a matter of law.
The sons then made a demand upon AT&T and brought suit again in federal district
court. Judgment for the sons was reversed by the Sixth Circuit, which ruled that demand was not
a necessary prerequisite for the cause of action, which had thus accrued years earlier, so that
limitations and laches barred the sons’ recovery. Whether demand was a necessary prerequisite
to suit had been actually litigated and decided in the earlier state court action between the same
parties. Issue preclusion therefore mandated reversal of the Sixth Circuit. But the Supreme
Court took the opportunity to set forth principles under Erie:
A state is not without law save as its highest court has declared it. There are many
rules of decision commonly accepted and acted upon by the bar and inferior
73

West v. AT&T Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236 (1940).
Geri J. Yonover, Ascertaining State Law: The Continuing Erie Dilemma, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1988).
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See Yonover, supra note 48, at 308 n.13.
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courts which are nevertheless laws of the state although the highest court of the
state has never passed upon them. In those circumstances a federal court is not
free to reject the state rule merely because it has not received the sanction of the
highest state court, even though it thinks the rule is unsound in principle or that
another is preferable. State law is to be applied in the federal as well as the state
courts and it is the duty of the former in every case to ascertain from all the
available data what the state law is and apply it rather than to prescribe a different
rule, however superior it may appear from the viewpoint of ‘general law’ and
however much the state rule may have departed from prior decisions of the
federal courts.
Where an intermediate appellate state court rests its considered judgment
upon the rule of law which it announces, that is a datum for ascertaining state law
which is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other
persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise.79
Thus, certain rules of decision may be said to constitute “state law,” even though they have not
been articulated by the state supreme court. “All available data” should be used to decide what
the state law is. And the statement of an intermediate appellate court is a particularly strong
datum.
The Court repeated this last point in Stoner, the second of the 311 cases in which
discussion of Erie principles was edifying but unnecessary. In Stoner, a man had brought suit
against his insurance company in state court to collect disability benefits. In the course of the
state-court litigation, the Kansas City Court of Appeals twice construed the meaning of “total
disability” in an insurance contract under Missouri law. After those rulings, the insurance
company brought suit in federal court, seeking declaratory relief that the claimant was not
entitled to benefits for any time after the state-court litigation had been initiated. The Eighth
Circuit construed the “total disability” clause differently than had the state court and therefore
held that the insurance company was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As in West, the
federal case followed state-court “suits between the same parties involving the same issues of
law and fact.”80 Preclusion doctrines therefore required reversal of the court of appeals.81 But
the Supreme Court seized the opportunity to reiterate that federal courts sitting in diversity “must
follow the decisions of intermediate state courts in the absence of convincing evidence that the
highest court of the state would decide differently.”82
This presumption in favor following the decisions of inferior state courts drove the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in two other 311 cases that did pose genuine Erie issues. In Six
Companies of California v. Joint Highway District Number 13,83 the question was whether a
clause in a construction contract that provided for liquidated damages for a delay in project
completion was applicable to a situation where the “delay” was caused by the contractor’s
intentional abandonment of the project. The Ninth Circuit decided that the clause was not
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Id. at 236-37.
311 U.S. at 467.
81
Indeed, Judge Thomas had dissented from the panel majority below, but on the ground that “the finding and
decision of the majority is contrary to the law of the case.” 109 F.2d 874, 879 (8th Cir. 1940) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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applicable under California law, even though the only California appellate decision on the matter
had reached the opposite conclusion.
The Supreme Court reasoned that, so far as the relevant data disclosed, the single state
appellate decision constituted the law of California:
The decision in the [state appellate court] case was made in 1919. We have not
been referred to any decision of the Supreme Court of California to the contrary.
We thus have an announcement of the state law by an intermediate appellate court
in California in a ruling which apparently has not been disapproved, and there is
no convincing evidence that the law of the State is otherwise.84
The Court therefore reversed.
A similar result obtained in Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field.85 There, the issue was
whether a Totten trust was valid under New Jersey law. Such trusts had not been recognized
under the common law of the state, but in 1932, the state legislature passed a statute authorizing
them. Twice after 1932, however, the Chancery Court of New Jersey had revisited the issue, and
in both cases, the Vice-Chancellor had decided that the statutes were ineffective to change the
common-law rule. The Third Circuit, however, considered the statute unambiguous and
therefore applied it.
But the Supreme Court reversed. It emphasized that “[a]n intermediate state court in
declaring and applying the state law is acting as an organ of the State and its determination, in
the absence of more convincing evidence of what the state law is, should be followed by a
federal court in deciding a state question.”86 The Court then emphasized the importance of the
Court of Chancery in New Jersey’s court system—it has statewide jurisdiction, and its decisions
can be reviewed only by the highest court in the state. The Court concluded that “the decisions
of the Court of Chancery are entitled to like respect as announcing the law of the State.”87
The last of the 311 cases, Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co.,88 addressed the
altogether different question whether a change in state law during the pendency of a federal
appeal mandated reversal. Vandenbark was an occupational-injury case in which Ohio law
provided the rule of decision. When the case was filed in federal district court, the plaintiff
failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted under Ohio law. But “[a]fter
the action of the trial court in dismissing the petition, the Ohio supreme court reversed its former
decisions and, in an opinion expressly overruling them, declared occupational diseases such as
complained of by petitioner compensable under Ohio law.”89 The Vandenbark Court held that
the federal appellate court was bound to apply the later state law decision: “[T]he dominant
principle is that nisi prius and appellate tribunals alike should conform their orders to state law as
of the time of the entry. Intervening and conflicting decisions will thus cause the reversal of
judgments which were correct when entered.”90
The Court did not revisit the proper method for determining state law in federal court
until 1948 in King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America.91 In that diversity case,
the district court had construed a particular insurance-liability clause under South Carolina law,
84
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in the absence of any state court precedent on the subject. During the pendency of the appeal, a
South Carolina court of common pleas decided the identical legal issue in the same manner as
had the district court. The Fourth Circuit, however, decided that it was not bound by the state
court decision, and reversed the district court. After the Supreme Court accepted certiorari,
another South Carolina court of common pleas decided a case presenting the same legal issue,
and this case was contrary to the first state court decision. Given that, under Vandenbark, the
second state court decision could properly be considered, King presented the Court with an
opportunity to provide guidance for lower courts faced with a split of state court authority.
The Court, however, declined to take the opportunity. Instead, it decided that the Fourth
Circuit had not erred in refusing to follow the first state court decision (the only one outstanding
at the time of its decision). King self-consciously withdrew from a broad reading of Fidelity
Union Trust Co., which, the Court now explained, did not “lay down any general rule as to the
respect to be accorded state trial court decisions.”92 The Court distinguished Fidelity Union
Trust Co. by comparing the general importance of the Court of Chancery to the New Jersey court
system with the relative unimportance of the courts of common pleas in establishing South
Carolina law.
Because “a Common Pleas decision does not exact conformity from either the same court
or lesser courts” and “may apparently be ignored by other Courts of Common Pleas without the
compunctions which courts often experience in reaching results divergent from those reached by
another court of coordinate jurisdiction,” the Court concluded that a single decision by one such
court does not “of itself evidence” the law of the state.93 Remarking that “a federal court
adjudicating a matter of state law in a diversity suit is, ‘in effect, only another court of the
State,’” the Court reasoned that “it would be incongruous indeed to hold the federal court bound
by a decision which would not be binding on any state court.”94 Yet the Court was careful not to
say that the court of appeals could entirely disregard a common pleas decision. Rather, “[w]hile
that court properly attributed some weight to the Spartanburg Common Pleas decision, we
believe it was justified in holding the decision not controlling and in proceeding to make its own
determination of what the Supreme Court of South Carolina would probably rule in a similar
case.”95
Eight years later, in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America,96 the Court elucidated
some of the other “data” that a federal court might consider as “evidence” of state law. The
district court in Bernhardt had decided that, under Vermont law, an agreement to arbitrate was
revocable until the arbitral award had actually been made. In reaching this decision, the court
relied on a 1910 opinion by the Vermont Supreme Court, and the United States Supreme Court
saw no reason to second-guess the district court:
Were the question in doubt or deserving further canvass, we would of course
remand the case to the Court of Appeals to pass on this question of Vermont law.
But, as we have indicated, there appears to be no confusion in the Vermont
decisions, no developing line of authorities that casts a shadow over the
established ones, no dicta, doubts or ambiguities in the opinions of Vermont
judges on the question, no legislative development that promises to undermine the
92
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judicial rule. We see no reason, therefore, to remand the case to the Court of
Appeals to pass on this question of local law.97
Thus, under Bernhardt, recent opinions by state court judges may “cast[] a shadow” over an
older state supreme court decision, and “dicta, doubts and ambiguities” in state court decisions
are also indicia of what state law is. Presumably, therefore, conflicting state intermediate
appellate decisions can indicate the law of the state even when an older state supreme court
decision is contrary.
One can view Bernhardt as not only providing further guidance for federal courts on the
sources of state law, but also harmonizing the initial announcement that a federal court decide
state-law issues in accord with the pronouncements of the state supreme court with subsequent
cases that concerned the proper weight to be given to intermediate appellate decisions. Recall
that in West, the Court had stated that a federal court sitting in diversity must follow the rule
announced by the state supreme court unless the state supreme court “has later given clear and
persuasive indication that its pronouncement will be modified, limited or restricted.”98 But cases
after West had chastised federal courts for giving insufficient consideration to intermediate state
appellate decisions. Bernhardt confirmed that intermediate state appellate decisions could be
sufficient to give a federal court clear and persuasive indication that an older pronouncement of
the state supreme court was no longer the law of the state.
Finally, in its last pronouncement on the subject, the Court in Commissioner v. Estate of
99
Bosch instructed federal courts applying state law that, in the absence of a decision by the state
supreme court, they should “apply what they find to be the state law after giving ‘proper regard’
to relevant rulings of other courts of the State.”100 Although this general, almost off-hand
instruction about ascertaining state law is, as we shall see in Part III, quite helpful for
understanding the principle involved, it provides no explicit guidance on what the sources of
state law might be, or how they might interrelate.
B. The State of State Law in the Courts of Appeals
Despite the long amount of time since the Supreme Court last spoke on ascertaining state
law, the federal circuit courts of appeals have not developed a consensus approach to the sources
of state law, nor truly demonstrated consistent command of the principles involved. In one
recent Ninth Circuit opinion, for example, the court stated: “When interpreting state law, we are
bound to follow the decisions of the state’s highest court. When the state supreme court has not
spoken on an issue, we must determine what result the court would reach based on state appellate
court opinions, statutes and treatises.”101 Another decision by the same court the following year
differed both with respect the putative sources of state law, and in the subtlety with which the
task of ascertaining state law was described: “A federal court applying California law must apply
the law as it believes the California Supreme Court would apply it. In the absence of a
controlling California Supreme Court decision, the panel must predict how the California
Supreme Court would decide the issue, using intermediate appellate court decisions, statutes, and
decisions from other jurisdictions as interpretive aids.”102 The second decision substitutes
“decisions from other jurisdictions” for “treatises” as a source of state law. It also replaces the
97

Id. at 205.
311 U.S. at 236.
99
387 U.S. 456 (1967).
100
Id. at 465.
101
Vasquez v. North County Transit Dist., 292 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
102
Gravquick A/S v. Trimble Navigation Int’l Ltd., 323 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
98

Making State Law in Federal Court
Glassman

20

statement that state supreme court decisions are binding with a description of the court’s task as
applying state law the way that the state supreme court would apply it.
The Ninth Circuit is far from alone in its imprecision. One Sixth Circuit opinion
remarked:
State supreme court decisions are controlling authority for such determinations [of
state law], but if the state supreme court has not ruled on the precise issue in
question, this court must look at other indicia of state law, including state
appellate decisions. This court may rely on those other indicia of state law unless
there is persuasive data that the state supreme court would decide the issue
otherwise.103
This passage explicitly identifies only one source of state law other than state supreme court
decisions, state appellate decisions, although it suggests—by using the word “including”—that
other sources exist. In the very next sentence, however, the court states that it “may rely” on
these other indicia of state law “unless there is persuasive data” that the state supreme court
would decide the issue otherwise. This sentence indicates that “persuasive data” other than
“indicia of state law” might determine what state law is, but the court neither explains how this is
so nor provides an example.
As for sources of state law other than decisions by the state courts, the Second Circuit has
mentioned “decisions in other jurisdictions on the same or analogous issues.”104 A modified
version of this option was announced by the Fifth Circuit; in seeking to apply Texas law, the
court stated that “[w]e may also refer to rules in other states that Texas courts might look to.”105
The Fourth Circuit has opined that it “may also consider, inter alia: restatements of the law,
treatises, and well considered dicta.”106 An Eighth Circuit decision also mentions “considered
dicta” as well as “analogous decisions,” but hedges its bets by also including as a source of state
law “any other reliable data.”107 Judge Posner has written that “[w]hen state law is unclear…the
best guess is that the state’s highest court, should it ever be presented with the issues, will line up
with a majority of the states.”108 Even more pragmatically, another panel of the Seventh Circuit
remarked that “[w]hen there is a dearth of case law on a point, we will often turn to notions of
common sense.”109
Rarely do the sources of state law receive self-conscious attention from the federal courts
of appeals. Many of the statements in the foregoing paragraphs seem to be little more considered
than the selection of boilerplate language from circuit precedent. One exception is McKenna v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,110 an oft-cited Third Circuit opinion that has received the
endorsement of Professors Wright and Miller in their treatise.111 According to the McKenna
court, federal courts seeking to apply state law should look to the “broad policies” and “doctrinal
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trends” that are “evince[d]” by the relevant state precedents.112 These relevant precedents, the
court continued, are state supreme court holdings, followed by that court’s dicta, then the
decisions of lower state courts, scholarly treatises, Restatements of the Law, and, finally,
germane law review articles—with a particular emphasis on in-state schools.113
Part of the popularity of McKenna, one suspects, is that it provides one of the more
extensive decisional trees for approaching sources of state law. What may be surprising,
however, is that even after setting forth this decisional tree in the course of an unusually involved
discussion of the sources for and practice of applying state law in federal courts, the three judges
of the McKenna panel could not agree on the proper determination of state law in the case at
hand—whether Ohio would employ a “discovery rule” to toll the statute of limitations. Judge
Higginbotham opined in dissent that the “distinguished trial judge who tried this case so
patiently, was not unsympathetic to the plight of Mrs. McKenna; yet from my view he is being
reversed not because he was wrong but because the relevant Ohio law is unenlightened.”114 In
other words, the majority had only paid lip service—albeit extensive lip service—to the
application of state law; they had in fact replaced Ohio law with their own notions about what
the correct rule should be. Professors Wright and Miller do not discuss this aspect of the case in
their praise of McKenna. For the reasons that I will elaborate in Part III.C., however, the
majority in McKenna performed its duty commendably.
What none of these federal appellate exhortations makes clear, however, is how a district
court ought to go about ascertaining and applying state law where the identified state authority is
split. It is well and good to say that in the absence of a decision by the state supreme court, a
federal court is bound by the decisions of the state intermediate appellate courts, but that
statement provides no guidance for the situation where a couple state appellate court say that the
law is X, and a couple other state appellate courts say the law is not-X. Indeed, as the Seventh
Circuit discovered in Rekhi v. Wildwood Industries, Inc., a federal court could encounter “two
lines of cases [that] exist side by side; neither cites, or indicates any awareness of, the other.”115
In such a situation, although “federal courts treat decisions by its intermediate appellate courts as
authoritative,…a split among those courts makes such treatment impossible.”116
Certain of the federal appellate instructions discussed above are capable, as an analytic
matter, of addressing this situation. “Majority rule,” for example, provides an easy out, one
which the Seventh Circuit took in Rekhi.117 Turning to “notions of common sense” offers
another route, but it is less an instruction for how to deal with a split of state-court authority than
it is a blank check for the federal court to proceed however it pleases.
Locating a state’s “broad policies” and “doctrinal trends” is a third possibility, but it
suffers from serious difficulties. First, where intermediate authority is split, ascertaining those
policies may be difficult. As applied to the particular question at hand, after all, the split of
authority likely indicates that one could draw different conclusions about how to apply broad
policies (unless, of course, the various state-court decisions accord on their expressions of policy,
and the split has resulted from certain courts’ demonstrable error in implementing the policy
112
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doctrinally118). This was certainly the case in McKenna itself, the very opinion that announced
an instruction to look to broad policies.
Other federal courts, in contrast, have suggested almost the opposite instruction with
respect to “doctrinal trends.” The Seventh Circuit has decided to “avoid speculation about trends
in diversity cases: our policy will continue to be one that requires plaintiffs desirous of
succeeding on novel state law claims to present those claims in state court.”119 This view may be
shared by the Ninth Circuit, although its formulation of the relevant admonition is more
ambiguous: “federal courts look to existing state law without predicting potential changes in that
law.”120
Finally, at least three federal courts of appeals (the Third, Sixth, and Seventh) have
endorsed some version of the proposition that when faced “with two opposing, yet equally
plausible interpretations of state law,…for reasons of federalism and comity, we generally
choose the interpretation which restricts liability, rather than the more expansive interpretation
which creates substantially more liability.”121 Whether federalism and comity, or any other
reason, actually justify this rule is a matter to which I return in Part III.B. below.
For the present purpose of grasping the relevant doctrine, however, two points should be
recognized. First, the federal courts of appeals have not demonstrated a consistent command of
the meaning and import of the Supreme Court decisions that directly address sources for and
application of state law in federal courts. The second point is that although the federal appellate
courts have provided a handful of tools for choosing among conflicting state authorities, these
tools (1) do not follow ineluctably from the Supreme Court case law discussed above and (2)
sometimes contradict each other. Whatever theoretical basis does support these tests has not
been thoroughly explained.
C. Insight from the Standard of Review
In attempting to make sense of these various instructions, a more recent Supreme Court
decision is helpful. Before Salve Regina College v. Russell,122 federal circuit courts were
divided as to the appropriate standard of review for district court interpretations and applications
of state law. Most employed some kind of deferential standard.123 The rationale behind a
deferential standard of review was that district court judges were more likely to be intimately
familiar with the law of the state in which they say than were the reviewing circuit judges, who
hailed from different states and who had less frequent exposure to the law of any particular state.
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The Court rejected this position in Salve Regina, in part because it decided that
deferential review was inconsistent with Erie.124 What the Court found particularly unpalatable
in light of Erie was that “deferential appellate review invites divergent development of state law
among the federal trial courts even within a single State,”125 and that “appellate courts that defer
to the district courts’ state-law determinations create a dual system of enforcement of statecreated rights, in which the substantive rule applied to a dispute may depend on the choice of
forum.”126
Although these two problems might undermine with the salutary policy benefits of Erie,
they do not demonstrate why deferential appellate review of district-court determinations of state
law is inconsistent with the constitutional rationale of Erie. Indeed, Professors Fallon, Meltzer,
and Shapiro have suggested that Salve Regina was not compelled by Erie.127 I think, however,
that the holding was constitutionally compelled in light of Erie.
The Court confronted and rejected the principal rationale for deferential review at the end
of its analysis. Citing an article by Professor Philip B. Kurland, the Court explained:
[T]he proposition that a district judge is better able to “intuit” the answer to an
unsettled question of state law is foreclosed by our holding in Erie. The very
essence of the Erie doctrine is that the bases of state law are presumed to be
communicable by the parties to a federal judge no less than to a state judge….
Similarly, the bases of state law are as equally communicable to the appellate
judges as they are to the district judge. To the extent that the available state law
on a controlling issue is so unsettled as to admit of no reasoned divination, we can
see no sense in which a district judge’s prior exposure or nonexposure to the state
judiciary can be said to facilitate the rule of reason.128
State law, in other words, is still law. If, therefore, questions of law are subject to independent
review by the federal appellate courts, state-law questions must also be subject to independent
review, because to subject them to any other standard would be to treat them as something other
than questions of law. Put differently, the Constitution does not compel federal appellate courts
to review questions of law de novo. But once the decision has been made to review questions of
law de novo, the constitutional rationale of Erie does require that questions of state law be
subject to the same standard of review.
The broader lesson for federal courts seeking to ascertain and apply state law that Salve
Regina makes clear is that they should proceed in the same manner that they would in deciding
federal-law questions. As the Court itself explained, “[S]tate law is to be determined in the same
manner as a federal court resolves an evolving issue of federal law: with the aid of such light as
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is afforded by the materials for the decision at hand, and in accordance with the applicable
principles for determining state law.”129
The basic principle at issue in these cases is that federal courts should seek to apply state
law as a paradigmatic state court would. In a sense, as noted earlier,130 the task is no more and
no less subtle or complicated than legal reasoning generally. But this brings us to the real nub of
the problem. Opining explicitly on the task of ascertaining and applying state law requires one
to say something about how it is that we suppose courts go about expounding the law.
Specifically, to what extent does or should a federal court perform a state policymaking function
when it ascertains and applies unsettled state law? This is the fundamental question to which I
now turn.
III. ASCERTAINING AND APPLYING STATE LAW IN FEDERAL COURT: THREE
APPROACHES
A. Federal Superiority: An Argument Premised on Institutional Advantage in Legal
Reasoning
If ascertaining and applying state law in federal court is simply a matter of law, no
different than elaborating federal law, then perhaps federal courts should not be shy about
confronting unsettled state-law issues—or even settled ones. According to the Salve Regina
Court, federal courts are at worst equally as capable as state courts in applying state law. More
likely, however, is that federal courts are substantially more capable than their state brethren
because, institutionally, they are comparatively advantaged in dealing with questions of law.
1. Support for the Institutional Advantage of Federal Courts in Legal Reasoning
Academic literature from the late 1970s and early 1980s supports this view. In the Myth
of Parity,131 Professor Burt Neuborne argued that Supreme Court jurisprudence that assumed that
constitutional rights could be vindicated equally in state and federal courts was wrongheaded
because federal courts were institutionally preferable to state courts for raising federal
constitutional claims. The first reason that he offered to support a preference for a federal trial
forum was that
the level of technical competence which the federal district court is likely to bring
to the legal issues involved generally will be superior to that of a given state trial
forum. Stated bluntly, in my experience, federal trial courts tend to be better
equipped to analyze complex, often conflicting lines of authority and more likely
to produce competently written, persuasive opinions than are state trial courts.132
Professor Neuborne identified five bases for the superior technical competence of the
federal courts. For three reasons, he contended, the federal judges themselves are of a higher
intellectual caliber than their state counterparts. First, “[b]ecause it is relatively small, the
federal trial bench maintains a level of competence in its pool of potential appointees which
dwarfs the competence of the vastly larger pool from which state trial judges are selected.”133
The second reason owed to crude market economics: federal judges are paid more.134 Third,
although conceding that the selection of federal judges was imperfect, Professor Neuborne
contended that it tended to focus more on intellectual merit than did state selection processes:
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“Neither elections nor an appointment process based largely on political patronage is calculated
to make refined judgments on technical competence.”135
In addition to the reasons supporting the technical superiority of federal judges
themselves, federal courts enjoy two other institutional advantages, in Professor Neuborne’s
estimation. Their caseload burden was less, for one thing.136 Second, they had better judicial
clerks:
Federal clerks at both the trial and appellate levels are chosen from among the
most promising recent law school graduates for one- to two-year terms. State trial
clerks, on the other hand, when available at all, tend to be either career
bureaucrats or patronage employees and may lack both the ability and dedication
of their federal counterparts.137
Professor Neuborne’s purpose in pointing out these institutional advantages of federal
courts was to support his argument that, contrary to then-developing Supreme Court
jurisprudence, one ought not expect that federal constitutional rights could be vindicated equally
in state and federal courts. Other parts of his article, accordingly, focused on other reasons to
suspect that federal courts were more likely to vindicate federal constitutional rights, such as
their insulation from majoritarian pressures. But the observations noted above are restricted to
relative advantages in performing legal reasoning, and no reason is immediately apparent why
they would not apply equally to legal reasoning where state-law provides the rule of decision,
especially if we proceed on the premise that “state law is to be determined in the same manner as
a federal court resolves an evolving issue of federal law.”138
Indeed, Professor David Shapiro made this logical extension in the very next volume of
the Harvard Law Review.139 Seeking to ascertain whether federal courts were in fact
contributing to the development of substantive state law, Professor Shapiro analyzed five
volumes of the Federal Reporter and three sections of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. He
identified twenty-one diversity cases in the Federal Reporter that “could be said to have made
arguably useful contributions to developing state law,” meaning that the opinions in those cases
were “reconciling or distinguishing existing precedent, synthesizing or analyzing state law, or
setting statutory or constitutional boundaries to the reach of state long-arm statutes.”140 The
Restatement also reflected the influence of federal courts on state substantive law: “Thirty of the
142 cases cited in the Reporter’s Notes in support of the new rules were federal diversity cases,”
a statistic that was “particularly striking in light of the fact that the sum of diversity litigation
equals only about two percent of the total litigation in state courts of general jurisdiction.”141
This disproportionate contribution of federal courts to the development of state law, Professor
Shapiro noted, could owe to the “more debatable…claim that the quality of justice available in
135

Id. at 1122.
Id.
137
Id.
138
Salve Regina, 499 U.S. at 227 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). For an example noting this point
in the commentary, see MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE & JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS: THE
INEVITABILITY OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 8 – 9 (1999) (“Although the arguments against parity are of greater
moment in those cases where a potential loss of liberty is involved, there is little distinction made, in the qualitative
perspective, between criminal and civil litigation. The rather disturbing conclusion reached from this premise is that
litigants should always prefer a federal to a state forum and that federal courts should never shrink from policies that
result in maximum review of state action through appeal, habeas corpus, diversity jurisdiction, etc.”).
139
Shapiro, supra note 47.
140
Id. at 325.
141
Id. at 326.
136

Making State Law in Federal Court
Glassman

26

the federal courts is superior to that provided in state courts.”142 In support of this hypothesis, he
echoed Professor Neuborne, noting that “federal courts may provide less crowded dockets, more
efficient procedures, and, in some areas, better judges, at least at the trial level.”143
Professor William M. Landes and then-Professor Richard A. Posner attempted to
generalize and systematize Professor Shapiro’s rather subjective analysis in their article Legal
Change, Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction.144 They constructed two samples of
common-law decisions, one by federal courts and one by state courts, and then employed
economic analysis to determine which sample produced the most influential precedent and along
which vectors.145 Next, they examined the proportional representation of state and federal
precedents in contracts, property, and torts casebooks.146 Although these inquiries did not
produce overwhelming evidence, the authors concluded that they had uncovered
“some…evidence that the federal courts of appeals are more productive than state supreme
courts as measured by the value of their precedent output,”147 and certain analyses indicated that
federal-court opinions were “higher quality” than state-court ones—that is, other courts
demonstrably found the federal-court opinions more persuasive.148 The authors therefore
concluded, “contrary to the conventional view,” that “the federal courts in diversity cases appear
to make a significant contribution to the continuing development of the common law.”149
These conclusions hardly surprised Professor Neil Kent Komesar in his response to the
article.150 Without citing the Myth of Parity, Professor Komesar replicated many of Professor
Neuborne’s observations, although here in the context of federal-court superiority to state courts
in elaborating state law and without the limiting qualification of comparing only federal trial
courts to state trial courts. He thus noted that “a state supreme court justice may confront a
larger caseload or set of tasks than a judge on the federal court of appeals.”151 Moreover, he
recognized that “[f]ederal district court judges write extensive and well-researched opinions in
many cases. They are likely to have as much, if not more, research support staff—judicial
clerks—than state supreme court judges, let alone state trial court judges.”152 Finally, he cited
the fact that “[f]ederal judgeships are on the whole more attractive to those interested in the
judiciary” because of higher pay, life tenure, and so on.153
No developments in the twenty-five years since this scholarship was produced provide a
reason to question the continued vitality of these observations. To the contrary, recent evidence
indicates that state court dockets, including state intermediate appellate courts as compared with
federal district courts, remain comparatively overburdened.154 Second, those law clerks who
142

Id. at 328-29.
Id. at 329 (footnotes omitted).
144
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 367 (1980).
145
Id. at 372-80.
146
Id. at 383-85.
147
Id. at 383.
148
Id. at 381.
149
Id. at 386.
150
Neil Kent Komesar, Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction: A Comment, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 387 (1980).
151
Id. at 392.
152
Id. at 393-94.
153
Id. at 394.
154
See Edward J. Najam, Jr., Caught in the Middle: The Role of State Intermediate Appellate Courts, 35 IND. L.
REV. 329, 330 (2002) (“State trial and appellate courts handle most of the nation’s judicial business and dominate
143

Making State Law in Federal Court
Glassman

27

achieved the highest marks at the most prestigious schools continue to work primarily for the
federal courts of appeals, secondarily for federal district courts, then for state supreme courts,
and only occasionally for state intermediate appellate courts.155 Third, some have intimated that
the increasing prominence in recent years of “special interest” groups in the funding and conduct
of judicial elections may be resulting in the election of less qualified state-court judges.156
Although several commentators have noted that the likelihood that federal courts will more
routinely vindicate federal rights may change along with the changing composition of the federal
and state bench,157 none has undermined the continued comparative advantage of federal courts
in terms of technical legal competence. Indeed, in a 1999 work promoting judicial federalism,
Professors Michael Solimine and James Walker conceded that “even if state trial judges have
fewer shortcomings than asserted by critics of parity, the quality of federal judges (however
measured) is clearly higher.”158
2. An Argument for Instruction
One might conclude, then, that federal courts ought not be shy about resolving conflicts
and tensions in state law because they are better equipped to do so than are state courts
themselves. Federal courts, on this rationale, should reach out to assess and pronounce upon
unsettled state law. They should identify state-court opinions that are incorrect or are the product
of poor legal reasoning and should explain why this is so. And they should publish their
opinions.
Somewhat weaker forms of this position have sometimes been championed under the
banner of “cross-fertilization” or “cross-pollenization.”159 In other words, as Professor Geri
Yonover has put it, “[g]enetic diversity by hybridization, cross-pollination, and cross-breeding
increases the health of flora and fauna…. A like result of the interplay between the dual state and
federal judicial systems produces, I believe, a healthier specimen.”160 But this banner is too coy.
Federal judges do not employ a brand of legal reasoning that is distinctly “federal.”
Indeed, a certain difficulty attends even to deciphering what would constitute a distinctly
“federal” or “state” way of thinking. The analogy to cross-fertilization is therefore inapt. It is
not so much that federal courts’ opinions on state law contribute something different in kind to
the judicial landscape with many more judges, courts and cases than their federal counterparts.”); id. at 332 (“[S]tate
intermediate appellate judges preside over growing caseloads with finite resources.”).
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the development of state law. Rather, the idea here is that federal courts are simply better at
doing the same legal reasoning that state courts ought to be undertaking.
State law may be unsettled because the state courts are confused about a matter of
doctrine. Or a split of intermediate state authority could exist because certain courts in the state
have taken a position that is demonstrably erroneous. Where either of these situations exists, the
federal court that opines on state law is effectively doing a favor to the state judicial system—
helping it along, using its institutional advantages to show the way out of the thicket. This is not
cross-fertilization. It is instruction.
One example of such instruction is the opinion in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp.161 That diversity case required the Northern District of Illinois to determine which
statute of limitations was appropriate under Illinois law for a product-liability claim involving
damage to property. Although the general statute of limitations for such actions was five years,
another section of the Illinois Code provided for a much longer statute of repose, as well as a
subsection that provided for a two-year-from-discovery exception to the statute of repose.162 The
defendant pointed out that two Illinois appellate decisions had held that this two-year subsection
actually provided the applicable statute of limitations. But the district court identified a third
Illinois appellate decision that, although cited by neither party, was directly contrary to the two
cases cited by the defendant. The court then reasoned that dicta by the Illinois Supreme Court
was consistent with the rationale of the minority position and inconsistent with that of the
majority position because it described the subsection as an exception to the statute of repose, not
as setting forth an independent limitations period, and that the majority position was
“fundamentally inconsistent with the well known principle, applied in Illinois as elsewhere, that
a statute must be read, where possible, to give meaning to all of its terms.”163 The majority
approach to the subsection read out of the statute its reference to the general statute of
limitations. In other words, the law in Illinois was unsettled on this point because two courts had
misread the relevant statutes, while a third had read them correctly. The district court decided
that the Illinois Supreme Court would adopt the correct position and therefore denied the
defendant’s motion to dismiss.164 When the issue finally came before the Illinois Supreme Court
a couple years later, the court did, in fact, adopt the Northern District of Illinois’s position.165
Such instruction is a good thing because it furthers the core rule-of-law values of
coherence and predictability. Where the law is unsettled, citizens (including both individuals
and entities) are unable to conform their behavior to its dictates because they cannot ascertain
what those dictates are. They cannot assess the likely costs of anticipated actions because the
law does not provide them with clear guidance as to how those actions would be evaluated in the
courts.
Doctrinal incoherence, moreover, exacerbates this problem. Rather than simply not
knowing how the law would treat certain actions, citizens face the disconcerting situation of one
court saying that X action yields liability and another court simultaneously saying that X yields
no liability, even though both courts are charged with expounding the same law. The reasoning
that the conflicting state courts offer to support these divergent results is likely to be quite
different, thus extending the uncertainty far beyond the particular situation about which the
161
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courts disagree. Potential litigants cannot count on any particular rationale being applied to new
fact patterns.
By resolving doctrinal incoherence in state law or otherwise indicating the best
application of existing law to new facts, federal courts thus do more than simply satisfy an
intellectual aesthetic preference for uniform doctrine. They further the rule of law within the
state. Federal courts should therefore be encouraged to bring their considerable legal-reasoning
powers to bear on unsettled issues of state law.
3. Does the Instruction Approach Violate Erie?
One possible objection to this approach is that it is inconsistent with the rationale of Erie.
The point of Erie, after all, is that federal courts, in the category of cases of interest here, are
supposed to be applying state law, rather than expounding federal law. If federal courts’ superior
legal reasoning capabilities justifies their putting forth “correct” interpretations of state law, what
was the necessity of Erie? Why, that is, can state substantive common law diverge from federal
expositions of general law? Perhaps the very fact of divergence, coupled with the Erie command
that state substantive law controls, indicates that federal courts are not actually capable of legally
reasoning about state law.
As I will explain momentarily, I think this objection is largely right, but the rule of Erie
alone is not sufficient to justify it. In Erie, “general law” suggested one outcome, and state law
arguably suggested a different outcome; although the Supreme Court held that state law must
control and explained that general federal common law does not exist, it did not explain why
state law in this instance differed from the common law generally understood. What the Erie
Court did recognize was that a state supreme court, just like a state legislature, could choose to
deviate from general common-law rules. Subsequent decisions, as we have seen, indicated that
inferior state courts were equally capable of departing from particular common-law principles.
At any one time, however, the federal court still has only one set of state-law decisions to
apply. Thus, for example, California and Virginia presently adhere to very different versions of
the parol evidence rule. The California Supreme Court has held that parol evidence may be
introduced not only to resolve ambiguous terms in a written contract, but also to demonstrate that
terms are susceptible of varying interpretations in the first place.166 On the other hand, the rule
in Virginia is that parol evidence is admissible only in the former circumstance.167 All Erie says
is that the federal court must reason using the relevant state-law materials. Where Virginia law
applies, a federal court is obligated to adhere to discernable Virginia law, rather than California
precedent, even if, in the federal court’s opinion, California has articulated the parol evidence
rule more soundly, in the scheme of general principles of contract law, than has Virginia.168
This proposition may be viewed more abstractly. Recall that classical legal thought
viewed the common law as an inexorable logic expanding from core conceptions.169 It is entirely
possible to read Erie as rejecting the naturalness of only the second proposition. That is, state
courts may substitute the core conceptions, but the authority to substitute does not necessarily
mean that the common law within a state is not a system of logic expanding from those
substituted conceptions.
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Thus, although a state remains free to deviate from the generalized concepts of private
law, such deviation is essentially a conscious decision that does not undermine the operation of
legal reasoning in relation to the altered signposts in the precedential landscape. One scholar,
Professor Michael C. Dorf, has argued that this ought to be the end of the discussion of federal
court application of state law: “A federal judge sitting in diversity should not attempt to view
herself inside the head of a state high court judge; instead, she should try to view the state law—
in all its subtlety—inside her own head, as she resolves legal disputes in accordance with state
law.”170 Indeed, he maintains that this is a “remarkably simple proposition.”171 The rule of Erie
and its progeny alone, therefore, do not necessarily undermine the contention that where state
precedent is conflicting, a federal court may be institutionally advantaged to identify the correct
resolution of the conflict in light of other state law precedent.
4. Why the Instruction Approach Is Flawed
To understand how this position would work, and also why it is wrong, however, one
need only examine a concrete example. Recall the situation that I provided in Part II.C. of the
state-law contract issue that worked its way into the federal court for the Southern District of
Ohio through a combination of federal civil rights laws and the Federal Arbitration Act: a
plaintiff sues her former, at-will employer for sex discrimination, and the employer responds that
she agreed to arbitrate the claim by signing an employee handbook halfway through her period
of employment, which contained a provision that any claim she has against the company must be
arbitrated.
Because the Federal Arbitration Act directs district courts to enforce valid agreements to
arbitrate, one central question is whether a valid arbitration agreement existed between the
parties. The state law that ordinarily governs the formation of contracts must be used to answer
that question;172 arbitration, perhaps obviously, is conditioned on the existence of a contract that
contains an arbitration clause.173 Under Ohio law, the required elements of a valid contract are
“offer and acceptance, supported with valid consideration.”174
Ohio comprehends “consideration” as case books and contract treatises set it forth. That
is,
Under Ohio law, consideration consists of either a benefit to the promisor or a
detriment to the promisee. To constitute consideration, the benefit or detriment
must be “bargained for.” Something is bargained for if it is sought by the
promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange
for that promise.175
Certainly, the former employer’s unilateral, mid-employment imposition of a requirement that
the at-will employee arbitrate any claim that she has against the company is a detriment to the
170
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employee, but how is it bargained for? What has the company exchanged for the employee’s
promise to arbitrate? According to the company, it continued to employ the employee, and that
was sufficient.
In 2001, intermediate Ohio appellate courts were divided as to whether “continued
employment” of an at-will employee constituted consideration sufficient to make enforceable an
employee’s mid-employment agreement to a new term imposed by her employer. Several Ohio
appellate courts had held that continued employment was not adequate consideration.176 But
more had reached the opposite conclusion. The reasoning of this majority approach was that “as
a result of the at-will nature of the employment, neither employer nor employee is obligated to
continue the relationship for any period of time. Continued employment, therefore goes beyond
what the employer and employee are already obligated to do and constitutes sufficient
consideration.”177
Under conventional legal reasoning, this majority approach was clearly wrong. Although
the employer was not obligated to continue employing the employee before she agreed to the
new term that the employer sought to impose, neither was the employer obligated to continue
employing the employee after she agreed to the new term, as long as employment remains at
will. One moment after the employee signs a handbook containing an agreement that she will
arbitrate her disputes, the company may terminate her employment. Unless the company has
agreed to continue to employ the employee in exchange for her agreeing to the term of the new
handbook (thereby removing the relationship from the realm of at-will employment), therefore,
“continued employment” is not consideration sufficient to support the imposition by the
employer of the new term in the middle of a period of employment. This substantive position
accords with that set forth in treatises on contract law and in several opinions by federal appellate
courts.178
In 2001, then, the Ohio appellate courts were split over an issue that, in light of the
doctrine upon which all Ohio courts agreed, had one formally correct resolution (albeit not the
resolution adopted by a majority of Ohio appellate courts). The federal district court, pursuant to
theory outlined in this section, should therefore have applied Ohio law by identifying the split of
authority, explaining why the majority approach was doctrinally incorrect, and ruling in favor of
the plaintiff on this issue. By bringing its superior legal reasoning capabilities to bear on the
unsettled issue of state law, the district court could have provided guidance to the Ohio courts
struggling with the issue.
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But a funny thing happened in 2004. The Ohio Supreme Court adopted the continuedemployment-is-consideration approach. In a case concerning the enforceability of a covenant
not to compete, the court accepted a certified conflict from the court of appeals, and then
reasoned (erroneously, as a matter of contract-law doctrine) that “[t]he employee’s assent to the
agreement is given in exchange for forbearance on the part of the employer from terminating the
employee.”179 Justice Alice Robie Resnick pointed out in dissent that the majority opinion
transformed a “mutual exchange of nothing into consideration,” even though “the employer
simply winds up with both the noncompetition agreement and the continued right to discharge
the employee at will, while the employee is left with the same preexisting ‘nonright’ to be
employed for so long as the employer decides not to fire him.”180 The majority failed to address
this criticism, instead holding that “consideration exists to support a noncompetition agreement
when, in exchange for the assent of an at-will employee to a proffered noncompetition
agreement, the employer continues an at-will employment relationship that could be legally
terminated without cause.”181
In what sense, then, was the split of intermediate state appellate authority before this
decision capable of a “correct” resolution? The resolution that seemed to accord best with the
other state-law concepts of contractual consideration and at-will employment was not, in fact, the
resolution selected by the state supreme court. And yet, under Erie, it is fundamental that once
the state supreme court opines on an issue, it is the opinion of the state supreme court that
determines state law, even if that opinion seems poorly reasoned or illogical in light of other
state-law doctrines that were not unsettled and that ought by their terms to have decided the issue
under consideration.
The answer is that the split of authority was capable of “correct” resolution only
formalistically, and that such formalism does not necessarily capture how state courts decide
issues. This puts a finer point on the legal realist insight that the law is ultimately what courts do
in fact. Not only are states capable of deviating from general principles of common law, which
is, as discussed above, a necessary aspect of Erie, but they also do not necessarily decide cases in
accordance with the legal principles set forth in their own case law as it exists at any one time.
Where state law is conflicted on a particular point, one position may be termed mistaken with
reference to the body of state law as a whole. But once state cases settle on that position, the fact
of settlement transmogrifies the mistake into the law. Precedent and principle, in other words,
operate dialectically.
Something other than pure legal reasoning—by which I mean reasoning to a result using
only “the three dimensions of authoritative premises, facts and analysis,” as in Professor Duncan
Kennedy’s helpful formulation182—is thus involved in the development of state law. Whether
this other is denominated politics, judgment, or perhaps simply imperfection is immaterial to the
immediate point that it does in fact exist and that the concept of law incorporates it.183
This brute fact requires the conclusion that although federal courts may offer opinions on
unsettled state law that seem to accord better with principles of settled state law than other
179

Lake Land Employment Group of Akron, LLC v. Columber, 804 N.E.2d 27, 32 (Ohio 2004).
Id. at 34 (Resnick, J., dissenting).
181
Id. at 32.
182
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1724 (1976).
183
See id. (“Yet most contemporary students of legal thought seem to agree that an account of adjudication limited
to the three dimensions of authoritative premises, facts and analysis is incomplete. One way to express this is to say
that ‘policy’ plays a large though generally unacknowledged part in decision making. The problem is to find a way
to describe this part.”) (footnote omitted).
180

Making State Law in Federal Court
Glassman

33

opinions, they can never offer “correct” resolutions of conflicting state-law authority. The state
supreme court could always resolve the conflict differently. For this reason, describing a
particular position as “correct” or “incorrect” is incomplete. Whatever institutional advantages
in legal-reasoning capabilities federal courts may enjoy over their state counterparts therefore
does not justify the claim that federal courts are better situated to resolve unsettled issues of state
law. Despite the Salve Regina Court’s instruction that state law is subject to elaboration by
federal courts in the same manner as is federal law—or, perhaps, because of it—federal courts
cannot necessarily resolve unsettled or conflicting state law through conventional legal
reasoning.
B. Federal Incompetence: An Argument Premised on Notions of Federalism and Comity
If the idea that federal courts should just tell their state counterparts the “right” answers
to unsettled state-law issues is untenable, then perhaps the opposite position is meritorious. This
view maintains that federal courts are generally incapable of applying state law under any
circumstances, or at least where it is arguably unsettled. Moreover, to the extent that federal
courts do try to ascertain and apply unsettled state law, their efforts are inimical to state
sovereignty and even to Erie itself. Adherence to this theory counsels a strong policy of
avoidance and the idea that federal courts ought to treat state law as “static.” In recent years,
several scholars have put it forward with varying degrees of forcefulness. This section examines
the “federal incompetence” argument.
1. The Problem of “Making” State Law
Judge Dolores Sloviter of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals announced something like
this thesis in a relatively strong form in a 1992 article.184 Like Professor Shapiro, whose work
reaching the opposite conclusion was discussed in the Part III.A.1., the purpose of Judge
Sloviter’s article was to address the propriety of the existence of diversity jurisdiction as a policy
matter. Evaluation of diversity jurisdiction, she contended, has largely “overlooked that the
filing of approximately 60,000 diversity cases in the federal courts each year results in the
inevitable erosion of the state courts’ sovereign right and duty to develop state law as they deem
appropriate.”185
The root of the problem, she argued, is that “[f]inding the applicable state law…is a
search that often proves elusive.”186 That is, federal judges who understand Erie ought to be
capable of applying state law where it is clearly established, but how should the federal court
predict what the state’s highest court would decide where the state supreme court precedent is
old and intervening doctrinal trends cast doubt on it?187 What weight ought to be given to state
intermediate appellate decisions, especially where they are inconsistent?188 And what if there are
no state-court decisions on an issue at all?189 Judge Sloviter noted that “[d]espite our best efforts
to predict the future thinking of the state supreme courts within our jurisdiction on the basis of all
of the available data,” the Third Circuit and its district courts “have guessed wrong” on several
issues of state law.190
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These “wrong guesses” cause at least four problems. First, “such incorrect predictions
inevitably skew the decisions of persons and businesses who rely on them.”191 Second, they
“inequitably affect the losing federal litigant who cannot appeal the decision to the state supreme
court.”192 Third, they might confuse lower state courts into erroneously “accept[ing] federal
predictions as applicable precedent.”193
But the worst effect of federal-court opining on state law is that it “verges on the
lawmaking function of the state court.”194 Even where federal courts do no more than fill in the
interstices of state law, that is, they are effectively “making” state law, despite the fact that the
federal judge “is certainly not as likely to be as attuned as a state judge is to the nuances of that
state’s history, policies, and local issues.”195 In sum, “[w]hen federal judges make state law—
and we do, by whatever euphemism one chooses to call it—judges who are not selected under
the state’s system and who are not answerable to its constituency are undertaking an inherent
state court function.”196
Judge Sloviter’s prescription for these problems was simply to minimize state law in
federal court. She recognized the many difficulties associated with certification, such that it
could not be the answer to the problem she identified.197 And she conceded that, as a practical
matter, federal courts could not get entirely out of the application of state law.198 Given the
thesis that any interstitial elaboration of state law was an infringement of state sovereignty,
however, Judge Sloviter could offer no method for reducing this harm, suggesting instead that
the best strategy was for Congress to constrict diversity jurisdiction.199
2. Prediction, the Static Approach, and Liability Constriction
Professor Bradford R. Clark substantially elaborated upon this basic argument several
years later.200 Like Judge Sloviter, Professor Clark posited that “where existing law fails to
provide determinate answers to particular questions[,] common-law courts frequently exercise
policymaking discretion, either explicitly or implicitly, in order to supply a rule of decision that
will resolve the case at hand.”201 But unlike Judge Sloviter, whose objection to federal-court
application of state law was based on a general notion of state sovereignty and who conceded
that “there is no evidence that the founders were concerned, as I am, about the impact of
diversity jurisdiction on federalism principles,”202 Professor Clark found support for the
objection in Erie. Recall that the Erie Court held both that the law does not exist apart from the
authority that announces it and that federal courts have no general authority to generate
substantive rules of decision applicable in states.203 This latter aspect of the holding, Professor
Clark contended, ought to be understood as a rule of judicial federalism. That is, the
Constitution sets forth particular requirements for federal lawmaking, such as bicameralism and
presentment, that are designed to safeguard state sovereignty, but that would be avoided if judges
191
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made law.204 He concluded: “Strict adherence to the principles of judicial federalism recognized
in Erie is necessary to ensure that the political safeguards of federalism serve their intended
function.”205
Professor Clark then canvassed several methods according to which federal courts might
ascertain and apply unsettled state law to determine how these accord with judicial federalism.
His ultimate conclusion was that federal courts should not decide if at all possible; they should
use certification.206 For the reasons discussed in Part I.D., however, I think this approach is
unworkable in practice, and will therefore devote no further attention to it here. Nor will I
address the possibility of abstention—another way not to decide—that Professor Clark considers
but rejects as inconsistent with a separation of powers. With respect to actually deciding statelaw issues, Professor Clark first rejected the idea that federal courts should use their
“independent judgment” to create a cause of action because such would constitute “substantial
policymaking discretion on behalf of the state” and “the resulting cause of action [is not] state
law because, under Erie, only agents of the state have authority to adopt such law.”207
“Prediction,” which Professor Clark characterized as the dominant method in federal
courts, is subject to an almost-identical critique: “when federal courts fashion substantive rules of
common law applicable in a state using the predictive approach, both the procedural and political
mechanisms established by the Constitution to check the exercise of federal power are absent.”208
This is true whether the federal court is predicting a novel cause of action or a novel defense or
that state precedent will be overruled. Where a federal court’s prediction is later proved
“incorrect” by a subsequent state supreme court decision, “it becomes clear that the rights and
obligations of the parties were determined, not according to the ‘law of the State,’ but according
to ‘law’ adopted by a federal court.”209 Somewhat less obvious, however, is that “even if the rule
in question is embraced by the state’s highest court at a later date, it remains true that the rule
applied in federal court did not in fact constitute a sovereign command of the state at the time the
federal court rendered its decision.”210
A more attractive option from the perspective of judicial-federalism concerns is the
“static” approach, according to which a federal court refuses entertain the argument that a
particular proposition is state law until that proposition is firmly established in state
jurisprudence. This tack appears to solve the problem of federal courts surreptitiously making
state law (and thereby policy):
Under the static approach, federal courts apply substantive rules of decision only
to the extent that they constitute sovereign commands of the state—that is, only
after they have been adopted or declared by an appropriate agent of the state, such
as its legislature or judiciary. The requirement of adoption by an appropriate
organ of the state eliminates the possibility that federal courts will usurp state
lawmaking power by erroneously or prematurely making the fundamental policy
choices that are necessary to recognize (and apply) novel rules of decision on
behalf of a state.211
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Such reserve makes sense in light of the “background presumption” of “the Anglo-American
system” that all human activities are outside the scope of the law absent a positive action to the
contrary by a sovereign authority.212
Although no court has explained its supporting reasoning in the detail of Professor Clark,
several federal courts seem to have embraced the static approach. Requiring “plaintiffs desirous
of succeeding on novel state law claims to present those claims in state court,”213 stating that
“federal courts look to existing state law without predicting potential changes in that law,”214 or
applying “the law of the forum as we infer it presently to be, not as it might come to be,”215 all
sound in terms of state-law stasis.
This reasoning also might explain why certain courts have stated that where they are
confronted “with two opposing, yet equally plausible interpretations of state law,…for reasons of
federalism and comity, we generally choose the interpretation which restricts liability, rather than
the more expansive interpretation which creates substantially more liability.”216 I am unaware of
any opinion explaining the basis for this position. Indeed, several courts have simply stated it as
a rule and cited to previous federal authority, without even offering “federalism and comity” as
general justifications.
Nevertheless, this liability-restricting position accords with the
background presumption of legality that undergirds the static approach. Applying a rule that
results in liability where state law might be understood to result in no liability, on this view,
purports to set forth the command of a sovereign state at a time when it has not, in fact, spoken
definitively. Restricting liability, on the other hand, is not problematic because of the
background presumption that all actions are permissible until the government makes it otherwise.
3. Flaws in “Federal Incompetence”-type Approaches
The static approach and its underlying rationale, however, are fundamentally flawed for
two overlapping reasons. First, their objections to judicial lawmaking often fail to have any
distinct federalism dimension. These objections, in other words, do not lose their sting when
reformulated as between state courts or as between federal courts. Second, they embrace a view
of law that, although perhaps meritorious as a matter of theory, is beyond the mainstream legal
conception assumed by Supreme Court decisions.
The first problem is something like a conflation of indeterminacy in state law with
federalism concerns. According to Judge Sloviter, when a federal court makes a prediction of
state law that ultimately proves to be inaccurate, the litigant on the wrong side of the federal
prediction has been treated inequitably. Professor Clark similarly argued that in such a situation
“it becomes clear that the rights and obligations of the parties were determined, not according to
the ‘law of the State,’ but according to ‘law’ adopted by a federal court.”217 This is because the
opposite result would have obtained had state law (as made clear by subsequent decisions of the
state supreme court) been applied, rather than the federal court’s ultimately inaccurate
understanding of state law (before the state supreme court had made it clear).
But what is the relevance to this analysis that it was a federal court that had taken the
position ultimately spurned by the state supreme court? The same arguments could be leveled
where state law is unclear, and a state court applies a rule of decision that is rejected in a
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subsequent case by the state supreme court. By hypothesis, the state law was unclear. Perhaps,
as in the example of whether continued employment constituted consideration under Ohio law in
2001, state appellate decisions directly conflicted. To say that the matter would have been
decided differently in state court, as Professor Clark opines is “presumably” the case,218 is not
necessarily true; it is, rather, an unverifiable guess.
Judge Bruce M. Selya has thus persuasively reasoned that the litigant who loses on a state
law issue in federal court “is no more greatly disadvantaged than a litigant who loses in a lower
state court and is thereafter denied discretionary review, only to have the state’s high court
decide the issue favorably in some other case at a later date.”219 If one concludes that (1) the
rights and obligations of the parties to such a state-court suit were determined according to the
law of the state, but that (2) the rights and obligations of the parties to an equivalent diversity suit
in federal court were not determined according to the law of the state, and (3) both the state court
and the federal court applied the identical substantive rule, then the objection to the federal
court’s application of a rule of decision ultimately rejected by the relevant state supreme court
has nothing to do with the rule of decision actually employed.
To the extent that the losing litigant is treated unfairly, she suffers the same injury in state
or federal court. No aspect of this unfairness results from the fact that it was a federal court,
rather than a state court, that applied a rule that was later rejected. Recognition of this
proposition supports the majority rule in the federal courts that a subsequent state-court decision,
even one by the state court of last resort, that is contrary to the federal court’s prior prediction of
state law is not a ground for relief from the earlier federal judgment pursuant to Rule 60 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.220
This argument applies equally to two other problems identified by Judge Sloviter that
result from “wrong” Erie guesses: that individuals will skew their conduct accordingly and that
lower state courts might be confused into accepting the federal decision as precedent. With
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respect to individuals using the federal decision to gauge their conduct, a wrong Erie guess by a
federal court should do no more to skew conduct than would a state-court decision using the
same rule.
And the idea that lower state courts might be confused into accepting federal decisions as
precedent seems odd indeed. If the lower state court finds the federal opinion to be a persuasive
explication of state law, using the decision as a guide would not be the result of confusion. If, on
the other hand, the lower state court somehow thought that it was bound by the federal-court
precedent, then again, there is nothing about this problem that turns on the identity of the court as
federal. A court in State B might use the substantive law of State A because of its own choiceof-law rules, and then opine identically to the hypothetical federal court. Lower courts in State A
would presumably be equally susceptible to the error that they were bound by the decision in
State B as that they were bound by the decision in federal court. In any event, there is neither
evidence to suggest nor reason to suppose that lower state courts are, in fact, confused as to
whether they are bound by federal-court decisions on state law.221
Chief Justice Rehnquist has made these points in another context. In Thomas v.
American Home Products, Inc.,222 the Eleventh Circuit had ruled on a matter of Georgia law, and
shortly after the court’s decision, the Georgia Supreme Court addressed the issue in another case.
The Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari, vacated the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, and
remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the new Georgia Supreme Court decision.223
Dissenting, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained, correctly in my view, that there was no need for
these further procedural machinations:
[B]y failing to predict the Georgia Supreme Court’s Banks decision the Eleventh
Circuit has in no way slighted the State of Georgia or upset the balance of our
federalism. I do not believe that this Court has a stake in the correctness of
discrete state-law decisions by federal courts, nor, in such cases, any obligation to
weigh justice among competing parties.224
Neither parties nor states are harmed by “wrong” Erie guesses.
Closer examination reveals a similar problem with Professor Clark’s contention that
federal courts’ deciding state law where that law is unsettled has an unconstitutional dimension.
On his reading of Erie, federal courts have no power to “make” law even interstitially, but there
is no equivalent difficulty, as a matter of federal constitutional law, when state courts do so
because the Constitution imposes no procedural requirements for state lawmaking.225 The
federalism aspect of this argument, however, is rather unclear. If the constitutional contention is
correct, then a federal court that applies unsettled federal law is also “making” law applicable in
a state without following the political safeguards of federalism. Again, therefore, the objection
put forward to federal courts applying unsettled state law does not have any distinct federalism
dimension. It is, rather, a very far-reaching constitutional claim that federal courts ought not
221
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apply law where that law is arguably unsettled, or at least that federal courts should employ a
static approach to all unsettled law—federal or state.
One can, however, refashion the constitutional argument into one about political
legitimacy that is not subject to the same rejoinder. That is, citizens who disagree with how state
judges develop state law may vote those judges out of office, but they cannot do the same to
federal judges; therefore, the development of state law by state judges is more politically
legitimate. But this argument also sweeps too broadly. First, it counsels in favor of the election
of judges and so has much less force, if any, for states that appoint their judges. Similarly, it
does not explain why such political illegitimacy is acceptable when federal judges develop
federal law but not when they develop state law.
More fundamentally, whether articulated in terms of political legitimacy or
constitutionality, such an argument identifies a certain component of judging as policymaking
and seeks to minimize or eliminate it, but this is a task that cannot be accomplished. The
methods proposed to end judicial policymaking not only fail, they replicate the supposed evil
that they are designed to cure.
Even on its own terms, the idea that determining unsettled law involves substantial
policymaking, but applying settled law does not, is difficult to maintain because of the assumed
distinction between settled and unsettled law. Both Judge Sloviter and Professor Clark agreed
that where state law is clearly settled, a federal court may properly decide state-law issues
because, under such circumstances, it is merely applying state law, not making it. But how does
one determine when state law is unsettled?
One answer to this question is that state law is unsettled where it will admit of more than
one reasonable result. But this answer begs the question. Where the parties disagree on the best
reading of state law, how is the judge to decide whether one reading is unreasonable? The legal
realist Felix Cohen identified one aspect of this problem in his 1931 article the Ethical Basis of
Legal Criticism.226 As Cohen put it, whether a difference between two cases is important or not
is itself an ethical choice.227 Professor Scott Brewer systematically confirmed this insight more
recently. Analogical legal reasoning prevents one or more cases from ever determining
completely the next case. Although certain arguments may not work given a certain set of
precedents, the precedents themselves cannot fully constrain how they will be understood and
applied in future cases.228 For these reasons, the “federal incompetence” position suffers from
the same policymaking problem that it seeks to avoid because a policy choice is inherent in the
anterior question of whether state law is settled.
The inability to escape policy choices in adjudication is evident along another dimension.
Application of the static or liability-restricting approach in any particular case itself effects a
clear policy choice of which a state may not approve. Where a plaintiff has been injured by a
defendant’s conduct, for example, and state law is unclear as to whether the facts state a cause of
action, employing a static or liability-restricting approach is in fact a cost-allocation mechanism
between the plaintiff and the defendant. To say that the case should be decided on the basis of a
background presumption of Anglo-American jurisprudence that all things are permitted until
clearly prohibited is also to say that an injured party, and not the injurer, must bear the costs of
its own injury.
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Further, at least absent state case law so stating, there would seem to be no reason to
assume that any particular state would favor such a default cost-allocation system. Many states,
to the contrary, have expressed a background policy of fully compensating injury.229 How, then,
does the static or liability-restricting approach represent less of a policy choice than would the
opposite decision? They do not; they simply implement a different policy choice.
Similarly, as one commentator has demonstrated, where state law concerning exceptions
to the employment-at-will doctrine is evolving, how does a federal court better comport with
state law by refusing to recognize the evolution until clearly instructed to do so by the state
supreme court?230 The answer, again, is that it does not. Ruling in favor of a defendant
employer in such cases represents a policy choice that is qualitatively identical to that inherent in
ruling in favor of a plaintiff employee.
Indeed, another demonstration of the policy choices inherent in such “background rules”
is to show that they can yield diametrically opposed results. Despite their common origin, stasis
and liability-restriction appear to be capable of dictating different answers to the same situation.
Imagine that the state appellate courts had uniformly adhered to a rule that imposes liability, but
their decisions are all decades old, and newer state trial court opinions suggested the
development of a novel defense to one subset of the facts under which the older decisions had
imposed liability. State law would now seem to be at least somewhat unsettled as to the novel
defense that creates an exception to the general rule that imposes liability. A federal court
employing the static approach would presumably decline to permit a defendant to use the novel
defense. At the same time, however, the novel defense would restrict liability.
In sum, stasis and liability-restriction fail to achieve the objective of avoiding
policymaking by federal courts applying unsettled state law. They simply implement a particular
policy—usually, a defendant-friendly policy. Federal courts that follow it may therefore wind up
ascertaining and applying state law less faithfully than in the absence of such default rules.231
C. Using the Federal Court’s Own Judgment
1. Fundamental Flaws of Proposed Approaches, Reprise
Thus far, we have identified a line of cases in which the Supreme Court recognized, first,
that state courts are capable of determining state law that is different from generalized notions of
the common law and, second, that state law could be muddy and difficult for a federal court to
ascertain and apply. But this line of cases—Erie and its progeny—provides no hierarchy of
state-law sources or decision tree for selecting among conflicting state precedents. Nor have the
federal courts of appeals settled on any uniform method for the same. At the same time,
however, we have been told in no uncertain terms that state law is law that ought to be elaborated
by federal courts in the same manner as federal law.
We have therefore examined how these two principles ought to be understood together.
First, we considered the possibility that federal courts ought to use their superior institutional
advantages in legal reasoning to resolve state-court doctrinal confusion. But we were forced to
229
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discard this view because it failed to account for the fact that state supreme courts, as the
ultimate arbiters of state law, need not adopt the position that is “correct” in light of their own
precedent at any particular time, and when they fail to adopt that position, what had seemed to be
merely a mistake must be understood as the law.
Second, we considered one possible conclusion to be drawn from the disconnect between
“correct” legal reasoning and the reality that state law might develop along a different
dimension—that is, to apply unsettled state law is to “make” state law, and federal courts ought
to avoid this because although state courts are free to make their own law, federal courts do not
have the power to do so. But this position also failed. For one thing, upon close inspection, it
lacked any distinct federalism component, and was therefore an argument about the lawmaking
function of federal courts generally. For another, such an argument proved far too much, in part
because the distinction between settled and unsettled law cannot safely be maintained and in part
because the policymaking component of judging cannot be avoided.
Another way to understand the failure of these alternatives is to think about them in terms
of their conceptions of law. The position that federal courts can identify correct answers to
unsettled state law issues because of superior technical abilities, although capable of being
harmonized with Erie,232 depends on a conception of law as an unchanging system of logic that
connects existing precedents by means of principles. This is an accurate conception in some
respects, namely, that federal and state courts alike do attempt to reason in a principled manner
from existing authority. But it is unsustainable because state courts are not bound to, and in fact
often do not, resolve ambiguities in their own case law in the manner that a formalistic reading of
extant precedents might suggest.
The law changes, and it does not do so in a way that is dictated by existing precedents. In
part this is simply because the data set of precedents from which one seeks to deduce a rule of
decision is constantly expanding. At a certain time, one rule may plausibly account for the vast
bulk of past precedent, but whenever a state court issues a subsequent ruling, the proposed rule
might need to be altered to account for the new ruling. Precedent and the principle that underlies
it thus operate dialectically. In part, however, this also owes to the recognition that “[t]he life of
the law has not been logic: it has been experience;”233 some element of choice among multiple
options inheres in every judgment.
But the position that federal courts are incapable of deciding unsettled issues of state law
without “making” state policy relies on a conception of law where that element of choice is
paramount and omnipresent. On the one hand, we have just concluded that such choice is always
present. On the other hand, however, this is a view of law that courts cannot embrace because it
would mean that they are always, in effect, legislating. This conception of law, unsurprisingly, is
inconsistent with Erie’s progeny. Recall that in King,234 the Court reviewed a federal-court
judgment where the only two state-court precedents reached opposite conclusions, but the Court
did not even intimate that this meant that federal courts were disabled from finding and applying
state law or that, in doing so, they would be “making” state law. To the contrary, the Court
affirmed, thereby upholding the court of appeals’ judgment that was supported by the more
recent state-court precedent, in contravention of the static approach.
Combining these observations yields the conclusion that although deciding issues of
unsettled state law does involve a policy choice for the federal court, the conception of law that
232
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animates Erie and its progeny regards such choice as a component of finding and applying law
generally, rather than as “making” it. Another way to state this conclusion is that Erie and its
progeny recognize implicitly that federal courts “make” state law when they ascertain and apply
it, and that is simply something to be accepted. Indeed, the Salve Regina Court supported its
assertion that “[t]he very essence of the Erie doctrine is that the bases of state law are presumed
to be communicable by the parties to a federal judge no less than to a state judge”235 by quoting
Professor Kurland’s observation that “if the law is not a brooding omnipresence over the United
States, neither is it a brooding omnipresence in the sky of Vermont, or New York or
California.”236 And in his article, Professor Kurland preceded this observation with the slightly
more candid statement that “when reference is shifted to the law of the states,…the very essence
of the Erie doctrine is that a federal judge can find, if not make, the law almost as well as a state
judge.”237 Justice Frankfurter also obliquely acknowledged this fact of interstitial policymaking
as a necessary component of applying state law in federal court, I think, when, concurring in
Bernhardt, he stated that “[t]he essence of the doctrine of [Erie] is that the difficulties of
ascertaining state law are fraught with less mischief than disregard of the basic nature of
diversity jurisdiction, namely, the enforcement of state-created rights and state policies going to
the heart of those rights.” Less mischief, not none.
This irreducible element of policymaking within the confines of settled authority explains
why the Supreme Court could never purport to provide a comprehensive list of all of the sources
of state-law authority or a definitive decision-tree for how to evaluate them. To do so would be,
in essence, to tell lower federal judges how to reason legally and to judge. Such instruction
would be decidedly unbecoming. Concurring in Lehman Brothers, then-Justice Rehnquist
expressed shock at the mere suggestion:
I assume it would be unthinkable to any of the Members of this Court to prescribe
the process by which a district court or a court of appeals should go about
researching a point of state law which arises in a diversity case. Presumably the
judges of the district courts and of the courts of appeals are at least as capable as
we are in determining what the Florida courts have said about a particular
question of Florida law.238
2. Federal Judicial Brains
Rejection of these extreme positions, however, leaves us with another that does accord
with the conception of law assumed by Erie and its progeny. Given both that formally “correct”
answers to unsettled state-law questions do not exist and that an aspect of policymaking
necessarily inheres in deciding an unsettled issue of state law, there would seem to be no reason
for a federal court to do anything other than to exercise its discretion in furtherance of what it
thinks to be the best answer. I therefore think that federal courts ought to decide unsettled
questions of state law in the best manner that they think is permitted by state-law materials.239
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What makes a particular resolution “best” may vary from case to case and from court to court.
Where state law may be read to admit of multiple resolutions, a federal court might select one of
them because it thinks that resolution will promote substantive justice, or the court might
conceive of the best rule in terms of its promotion of efficiency, or views about the ease of
administration could counsel in favor of one rule over another. Whatever are a court’s criteria
for deciding which answers are better than others, there would seem to be no reason for the court
to select a second-best solution.
Variants of this sort of theory have sometimes been referred to as the “independent
judgment” rule.240 Professor Arthur L. Corbin put the proposition well in 1941:
When the rights of a litigant are dependent on the law of a particular state, the
court of the forum must do its best (not its worst) to determine what that law is. It
must use its judicial brains, not a pair of scissors and a paste pot. Our judicial
process is not mere syllogistic deduction, except at its worst. At its best, it is the
wise and experienced use of many sources in combination—statutes, judicial
opinions, treatises, prevailing mores, custom, business practices; it is history and
economics and sociology, and logic, both inductive and deductive.241
Without care, Professor Corbin’s exposition may be misread to state that federal courts ought to
decide state-law questions according only to what the federal court thinks would be the best rule
in the ideal world. Such a reading would be inaccurate.
The first sentence of the above quotation stipulates that a federal court must “do its best
(not its worst) to determine” state law. That is, the court cannot in good faith impose its ideal
solution without regard to existing state-law precedents. It must give those precedents proper
regard.242 At any particular time, certain arguments and rules will not be available on the basis
of extant sources of state law, and the rule of Erie is that these constraints must be respected.243
But where state law is unsettled, then by definition, state law will admit of more than one
answer. The determination that law is unsettled, as I have argued above, is not the product of
any particular formula: it too is a matter of the deciding court’s judgment,244 and federal courts
are capable of sensitivity to this question.245 State law, as it is applied in federal court, is thus
ultimately the federal court’s judgment as to how the data points of state authority ought—not
must—be connected.
3. Benefits to Independent Judgment
The benefits to such an approach are several. First, the parties before the court have their
dispute adjudicated according to the rule that the court thinks wisest, rather than according to
some other, second-best solution. Second, the judicial system of the state whose law is being
decide unclear state-law issues in the manner that the federal court thinks best is consistent with the principles of
Erie and its progeny.
240
See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
241
Arthur L. Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE L.J. 762, 775 (1941).
242
Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. at 465.
243
See, e.g., supra notes 166 - 168 and accompanying text.
244
See supra notes 226 & 226 and accompanying text.
245
A recent opinion by Judge Wood for the Seventh Circuit provides a rare, explicit acknowledgment: “It is true that
there are other decisions of the lower Indiana courts that point in the opposite direction. If the decisions of the lower
courts pointed consistently toward a different resolution of the precise question before us, our task would be more
difficult.” Lewis v. Methodist Hosp., 326 F.3d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). I think that under the
approach set forth in this Part, the identification of a minority position in the state courts would clearly be sufficient
to justify the federal court in deciding the question presented according to the minority approach if it thought that the
better result.

Making State Law in Federal Court
Glassman

44

applied gains the benefit of the federal court’s analytic skills and its judgment in demonstrating
the possibilities inherent in unsettled state law. A decision on state law by a federal court may
ultimately be accepted or rejected by the state judicial system,246 but a well-reasoned decision
can serve as a guide for state courts that find it persuasive.247 Where state law is unsettled, a
federal court opinion that sets forth the federal court’s judgment as to the best answer therefore
makes more likely, though it is certainly not required, that the state judicial system ultimately
will adopt this “best” position.
A third, less obvious benefit attends the admonition for federal courts to exercise their
independent judgment when state law is unsettled. The approach, perhaps paradoxically,
operates as a constraint on federal courts because it requires them to take responsibility for their
decisions. We have just noted the benefit that state legal systems may derive from a federalcourt opinion setting forth its view of the best resolution to an unsettled matter of state law; not
only do state courts have a guide to use in resolving the unsettled question should they find the
opinion persuasive, but because the guide exists, state systems are more likely ultimately to
adopt the federal court’s opinion of state law as their own. But this second result is a benefit to
states only if the federal court has set forth an opinion that is “better” than other possible
resolutions according to some vector against which the merit of legal opinions may be judged.
This requires the federal court to bring its skills and judgment to bear on the question at hand, to
determine what is, in its opinion, the best resolution of the issue, rather than permitting the
federal court to disown this responsibility by resort to some default rule.
4. Does Independent Judgment Comport with the 311 Cases?
One might object to my exposition of a federal court’s task that it is in tension with the
311 cases. After all, in several of those cases, only a state trial court or one state court of appeals
had addressed a particular issue, yet when the federal court of appeals resolved the state-law
question differently, the Supreme Court reversed and chided the federal court for failing to
follow state law. Would not the state supreme court have had the prerogative to decide that a
state trial court was incorrect? How, then, did the federal court err?
Contemporary critics of the 311 cases made essentially this point. Indeed, Professor
Corbin’s quote above is taken from an article in which he argued strenuously that the Supreme
Court was wrong in Field to have forced the Third Circuit to follow the New Jersey ViceChancellor’s seemingly erroneous construction of an unambiguous state statute: “Why did it do
this? Because a Vice-Chancellor, in another case could not, or would not, see what the
legislature meant. A court of first instance, and a single judge!”248 Thus, he complained that the
Supreme Court’s instructions forced a federal court seeking to ascertain state law to use “a pair
of scissors and a paste pot,” where it should “use its judicial brains” instead.249
There is a temptation to answer these questions by chalking the 311 cases up to a
particular legal historical moment. According to such an explanation, the Supreme Court in
1940 had to take an overly aggressive stance with regard to the respect that federal courts had to
accord state-court decisions in order to accustom the federal courts to the rule of Erie that state
law, as declared by state courts, not general common law, provided the rule of decision in
diversity cases. On this theory, by 1948 Erie’s requirements had become firmly established, so
the Court in King could afford to withdraw explicitly from a broad reading of the 311 cases. To
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the extent that commentators have attempted to reconcile the 311 cases with later Supreme Court
decisions, they have essentially adopted this position.250
Retreating from legal doctrine to legal history, however, is not necessary to harmonize
the 311 cases with my discussion of how federal courts should go about applying state law.
Instead, we need only take a closer look at the decisions by the federal courts of appeals that
were reversed. These cases rejected the pertinent state-court precedent on the basis of
generalized notions of the common law, supported either by no authorities or by citation to the
decisions of courts in other states.
In Field, for example, the Third Circuit first concluded that although its own precedents
“come pretty close to saying that a federal court must follow the construction of a state statute
made by a court not of final resort,”251 the court was not truly bound absent the pronouncement
of the state’s highest court. But in then reaching a decision on the merits that was contrary to
those of the New Jersey Court of Chancery, the Third Circuit stated simply that the state courts’
construction of the statute at issue “violates the plain if not artistic language of the statute, and
the fundamental rule of statutory construction that a statute must be construed to give effect to its
intent.”252
The court cited nothing in support of this proposition. Yet any number of aspects of New
Jersey law might have contravened it—a strong principle of legislative acquiescence253 or other
particular rules of statutory construction254 and so on. Had the Third Circuit reviewed New
Jersey principles of statutory construction, applied those principles, and on this basis disagreed
with the decisions of the Court of Chancery, one could conclude that the Third Circuit was in
fact applying New Jersey law, and the Court of Chancery had erred. In failing to engage with
any principles of New Jersey statutory construction, however, the Third Circuit in Field was
doing what Erie prohibited—resolving an issue of substantive state law using only its own
notions of general common law. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Six Companies was similarly
flawed.255 Contrary to Professor Corbin’s assumption in 1941, therefore, nothing about the 311
cases is inconsistent with the view of federal judicial decision-making with respect to state law
that I am advocating.
5. Independent Judgment in Practice
a. The “Prediction” Metaphor Reconsidered
250
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Even where they do not purport to employ one of the default rules debunked in the Part
III.B., however, federal courts have sometimes identified best answers to unsettled state-law
questions and then refused to apply them. The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Northrop Corp. v.
Litronic Industries256 is one conspicuous example. That case presented the court with the task of
interpreting § 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, as codified by Illinois, which concerns
the “battle of the forms” scenario—one company making an offer using a form contract and the
other accepting with its own form contract that contains discrepant terms—wherein the
acceptance form contains terms that are different, rather than additional, to those in the offer
form. Writing for the court, Judge Posner identified three possible rules:
One view is that the discrepant terms in both the nonidentical offer and the
acceptance drop out, and default terms found elsewhere in the Code fill the
resulting gap. Another view is that the offeree’s discrepant terms drop out and the
offeror’s become part of the contract. A third view, possibly the most sensible,
equates “different” with “additional” and makes the outcome turn on whether the
new terms in the acceptance are materially different from the terms in the offer—
in which event they operate as proposals, so that the offeror’s terms prevail unless
he agrees to the variant terms in the acceptance—or not materially different from
the terms in the offer, in which event they become part of the contract.257
The court explained that the third view was the best, in its opinion: “This interpretation equating
‘different’ to ‘additional,’ bolstered by drafting history which shows that the omission of ‘or
different’ from section 2-207(2) was a drafting error, substitutes a manageable inquiry into
materiality, for a hair-splitting inquiry into the difference between ‘different’ and
‘additional.’”258
Because no Illinois court had addressed this section of the Code, the Seventh Circuit had
no state precedent to guide its choice of rules. The court selected the first option, primarily
because a plurality of the states to have considered the question adopted that position and
“Illinois in other UCC cases has tended to adopt majority rules.”259 After further elaborating
upon the problems in both administrability and commercial dealing that the first two positions
entailed, Judge Posner observed that the previously identified “best” rule “dissolves all these
problems, but has too little support to make it a plausible candidate for Illinois, or at least a
plausible candidate for our guess as to Illinois’s position.”260
Judge Ripple concurred to emphasize that the idea that any state would adopt the flawedbut-barely-prevailing rule “is a principled approach to the dilemma faced by a federal court
when, in the absence of any pronouncement by the state courts, it is required to determine the
position of a state on the interpretation of a section of the Uniform Commercial Code.”261 He
added that the result was particularly good in this case because “there is evidence that Illinois,
when called upon to interpret the Code, has followed the majority approach.”262 Citing Judge
Sloviter’s article,263 he concluded “that, as an institution, we should stay within the confines of

256

29 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1175.
258
Id.
259
Id. at 1178.
260
Id. at 1179.
261
Id. at 1180 (Ripple, J., concurring).
262
Id.
263
Sloviter, supra note 184.
257

Making State Law in Federal Court
Glassman

47

our institutional role and make the best ‘Erie guess’ that we can. The principal opinion adopts a
principled approach to that task and I am pleased to join in its adoption.”264
But what is the principle? Certainly, the Northrop court did not avoid implementing a
policy choice. It simply supplied the policy that underlies the terms-drop-out approach, rather
than the better policy underlying the different-equals-additional approach.
The majority and concurring opinions justified this policy choice in large measure by
noting that in other cases involving the UCC, Illinois courts have followed the majority
approach. Such a justification is wanting. The Seventh Circuit did not cite any Illinois precedent
indicating that Illinois has a policy of taking the majority approach on UCC issues. Precedent of
this sort would provide a basis for opining that Illinois law prefers one possible rule over
another. Rather, the Northrop court based its decision on the fact that Illinois courts had, in the
past, sided with the majority approach in UCC cases. But perhaps in those cases, the majority
approach was also the best rule, and the Northrop court offered no reason to suppose that Illinois
courts would adopt an inferior rule—more difficult to administer and rendering commercial
transactions more uncertain—merely because a plurality of other courts had taken that route. In
sum, the Seventh Circuit opined that Illinois courts would make a poor decision, and proceeded
to adjudicate the rights of the parties accordingly.
The Seventh Circuit’s decision seems to be motivated by the sense that the court’s task
was to predict the rule that the Illinois Supreme Court would adopt—as a factual matter, rather
than a legal one. This notion, as we have seen, is wrong, but the mistake is easy to make.
Similar thinking animates Professor Nash’s recent argument that appellate deference to federal
trial court decisions on state law ought to be resuscitated because the latter have greater
“expertise” in predicting state law.265
To the contrary, correctly guessing how the state supreme court will resolve an unsettled
legal question is no better, in terms of Erie and its progeny, than guessing incorrectly. The
decision when made is still that of the federal court, not the state, however the state supreme
court may ultimately decide the question. As Professor Clark has explained: “even if the rule in
question is embraced by the state’s highest court at a later date, it remains true that the rule
applied in federal court did not in fact constitute a sovereign command of the state at the time the
federal court rendered its decision.”266
Not only did the Erie Court never instruct federal courts to predict state-court rulings as
factual, rather than legal, matters,267 subsequent Supreme Court decisions affirmatively indicated
that the task for federal courts was to ascertain and apply state law qua law, not make factual
predictions about what the state supreme court would do. This point should be clear from West,
where the Supreme Court explained that “[a] state is not without law save as its highest court has
declared it. There are many rules of decision commonly accepted and acted upon by the bar and
inferior courts which are nevertheless laws of the state although the highest court of the state has
never passed upon them.”268 State law thus is law, not a factual prediction of the future holding
of the state supreme court, a proposition confirmed by Salve Regina.269
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Northrop is not entirely bad in terms of the benefits to independent judgment that I have
identified here. The court identified the unsettled issue and brought its skills to bear on fleshing
out three possible resolutions and the likely advantages and disadvantages of each. Any Illinois
court confronting the same issue subsequently thus has the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning at its
disposal and remains free to adopt the better-reasoned approach. And the litigants themselves
have no gripe; any of the three rules was possible under Illinois law, so an Illinois court applying
Illinois law might have selected the same one as did the Northrop court.270 Nor does a court
necessarily err in thinking that where a state’s law is unclear, the state would ultimately decide to
follow the majority approach. Presumably, more jurisdictions have taken that approach because
they have concluded that it is the best one available. Where “majority” is merely a proxy for
“better,” surmising that a state would follow the majority approach accords with the view I am
advocating here.
But Northrop is still wrongheaded. First, by holding that Illinois would adopt a rule other
than the best one, the Seventh Circuit decreased the probability that Illinois would eventually
ratify that optimal rule as its own. Second, the holding offends the dignity and competence of
the state courts by assuming that they will fail to follow the reasoning that yields what the federal
court believes to be the optimal result. Finally, and most important, the court provided district
courts with an erroneous view of their task in ascertaining and applying state law.
What, then, should we make of the statement, quite frequently recited by federal circuit
courts but only very occasionally alluded to by the Supreme Court,271 that a federal court’s task
in applying state law is to predict how the state supreme court would decide the issue? Professor
Dorf has detailed that to the extent that courts, as in Northrop, understand such an admonition to
mean that state law, as distinct from federal law, should be ascertained using non-legal means,

reason, I think that Professor Nash’s argument for a narrow reading of Salve Regina proceeds from an erroneous
premise. He argues:
[T]he expertise required of federal courts is in analyzing existing state court jurisprudence and
predicting how the state high courts would resolve the issues. Since only the state court system
can resolve matters of state law definitively, it must be that the state court system as a whole has
greater expertise in this regard than do the federal courts. Hence, the Salve Regina Court erred in
suggesting that Erie presumes equal expertise on the part of state and federal courts to resolve
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the instruction undermines the basic rule-of-law ideal of impersonal justice.272 He has therefore
advocated the abandonment of prediction entirely.273
But this is simply an erroneous understanding of the meaning of the “prediction”
metaphor in this context. As we have seen, courts of a state may well diverge on issues of state
law; indeed, certain state courts may take positions that are directly opposite to those of other
courts in the same state. It would make no sense to say that, under these circumstances, state law
is some sort of Herculean synthesis of all state-court authorities.274
Fortunately, however, federal courts are not required to so synthesize. Every state
judicial system in the United States terminates in a court of last resort. For this reason, every
question of state law—from outright conflicts between intermediate appellate courts to marginal
inconsistencies in phrasing doctrinal standards—is capable of resolution, at least in the abstract,
by the determination of the state supreme court. Making that determination—predicting how the
state supreme court would resolve the state-law issue—is the task that a federal court must
perform in ascertaining and applying state law. Prediction means no more than this.
b. A Model Opinion
The better approach, as we have seen, is for the federal court to decide the unsettled statelaw question in the manner that the federal court, in its own judgment, thinks best. Another
Seventh Circuit opinion, Green v. J.C. Penney Auto Insurance Co.,275 furnishes an apt illustration
of this approach. Green was a suit by a subrogee against an insurance company for breach of the
duty to defend its insured, and one of the issues presented was whether such an insured could
recover the attorney fees that he incurred in prosecuting the declaratory-judgment action against
his insurer.
Illinois law governed the case, but the Seventh Circuit could find “no Illinois Supreme
Court case that is dispositive of this issue.”276 The court then turned to the state appellate courts,
and recognized that “[s]everal intermediate appellate court cases have held that an insured may
not recover attorneys’ fees and costs for bringing a declaratory judgment action against the
insurer.”277 But “the appellate court in the Fifth District has recently held that where an insurer
breached its duty to defend its insured, the insured party is entitled to attorneys’ fees in both the
underlying suit and the prosecution and appeal of the declaratory judgment action against its
insurer.”278
After pointing out that “[s]everal courts from other jurisdictions have also reached” the
result of the Fifth District case, the court decided to follow that rule: “In our view, Trovillion [the
Fifth District case] is the superior rule.”279 The court pointed out that this rule was consistent
with language in an Illinois Supreme Court case declaring that the damages for breach of the
duty to defend were compensatory. In addition, the court explained that it agreed with criticism
272
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of the contrary rule in a leading treatise on insurance law that the contrary rule “appears to be
unfair to the insured…. If the insurer can force him into a declaratory judgment proceeding and,
even though it loses in such action, compel him to bear the expense of such litigation, the insured
is actually no better off than if he had never had the contract right mentioned above.”280
Green is the right way for federal courts to apply unsettled state law. Finding no
controlling state supreme court decision, the court surveyed the state intermediate appellate
authority on point and discovered a split of opinion. Rather than avoid the question, look for
trends or the lack thereof, seek to constrict liability, or make some extra-legal guess as to how
the state supreme court would decide, the Green court selected the rule that it thought was best,
situated it in the context of decisions from other jurisdictions, explained that the rule cohered
purposively with principles articulated by the state supreme court, and then set forth clearly why
it thought the approach it selected was the best policy choice. Such an approach to deciding
unsettled state law questions makes the best sense of Erie and its progeny and also facilitates the
improvement of a state’s jurisprudence by providing a guide to state courts addressing the issue
in the future.
c. Independent Judgment Versus Instruction
One might fairly observe that the independent-judgment approach that I am advocating
resembles the federal-superiority approach rather strongly in practice. From the perspective of a
litigant, this is true. The motivation of the federal court exercising independent judgment
regarding unsettled state law is different from that of the formalist court, which, as I have argued
above, ought better to constrain federal courts and improve their decision-making, but their
production of legal rules may nevertheless look the same to the parties appearing before them.
D. Viewing the Federal Court’s View of State Law
1. How Should a State Court Treat a Federal Opinion on a Matter of State Law?
Another way to consider the foregoing, however, is through the eyes of a state court that
encounters the state-law question after a federal court has opined on it. How should the
subsequent state court treat the federal opinion? A range of views are imaginable: as it would
treat a law review article, or the court of another state, or another intermediate appellate state
court, or the state supreme court.
This last option, however, would turn cases like Field almost on their head. How could it
be that the opinion of a federal court, which is incapable of definitively setting forth state law,
bind a subsequent lower state court in the same manner as would a decision by the state supreme
court, which, Erie tells us, is the last word on state law? Some of the theories that we have
examined, however, would dictate just such a result.
One is the legal formalist approach elaborated in Part III.A. If one believes (1) that
unsettled questions of law are capable of correct resolution according only to their own terms,
that is, as a matter of the doctrine existing at that time, and (2) that federal courts are better
situated than state courts to apply their legal reasoning skills to reach such correct resolutions,
then a subsequent state court ought to treat a federal court’s opinion on an unsettled matter of
state law in the same way that it would treat its state supreme court’s opinion on the issue. The
subsequent state court ought to conclude, under these assumptions, that the state supreme court
would not decide any differently than did the federal court. Consequently, it should consider the
federal court’s opinion to be the authoritative articulation of state law on the issue and decide
accordingly.
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The Northrop court’s understanding of the prediction metaphor also supports a
subsequent state court treating the federal opinion like the opinion of the state supreme court.
On this rationale, the federal court has made a factual assessment that the state supreme court
would resolve the issue in a certain manner. Therefore, if a lower state court believes itself
bound by its own supreme court’s resolution of an unsettled issue of law, then the state court
should follow the federal opinion unless it can identify a factual error in the federal court’s
prediction calculus.
These theories of federal adjudication of unsettled state law would lead to the result of
subsequent state courts feeling bound to apply a federal opinion as if it were the opinion of the
state supreme court. But this result runs counter to the thrust of Erie and its progeny that state
courts, not federal ones, are the organs capable of defining state law. It is also a result that no
state court follows and that no federal court has instructed state courts to follow. That these
theories should lead to such a result is therefore an additional reason to conclude that they cannot
be right, in addition to those that we have already discussed.
Nor, however, would it make sense for subsequent state courts to conceptualize the
federal opinion as merely a law review article. On this view, the federal opinion does no more
than identify an unsettled issue of law and propose a solution. Two pertinent aspects of the
federal adjudication distinguish it from a law review article, however. First, a federal-court
opinion takes as its boundaries the existing data points of state law. A law review article, in
contrast, is not limited to the decisions of any particular jurisdiction. The decisions of any one
state serve only to illuminate the more generalized, abstract legal issue with which the article is
concerned.
Perhaps more importantly, a federal court is constrained to “do its best (not its worst)” to
determine state law. A law review article, on the other hand, is free to advocate the wholesale
abolition of existing doctrines. In proposing solutions to ambiguities in law, in other words, the
author of a law review article need not even purport to be applying the law. She may invent it
anew.
This shades into the second distinction between a law review article and the federal
opinion. The latter is adjudication. It resolves the rights of real parties to a real dispute and is
the product of the record and argument developed in that court. Law review articles concerning
matters of legal doctrine are not the products of an adversarial system. They might fail to grasp
the practical aspects of various rules that would be apparent in the context of an actual dispute.
On the other hand, law review articles might cover a particular subject in far greater detail than a
federal court opinion, analyzing perspectives that were tangential to the court’s focus or that
were never presented to the court.
The opinion of another state’s court is adjudication, but it takes as its boundaries the
existing data points of its own state law. Its reasoning on an analogous issue may be attractive to
a subsequent state court in another state. Because of the different starting points with respect to
precedents, however, its opinion does not set forth the law of the state in question and therefore
is less authoritative than a federal court opinion that does.
I think, then, that a subsequent state court properly views a federal opinion on an
unsettled state-law issue in the same manner as it would the opinion of a court of appeals in that
state, rather than as a law review article, the opinion of the court of another state, or the opinion
of its own supreme court. This accords with the Supreme Court’s remark in King that “a federal
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court adjudicating a matter of state law in a diversity suit is, ‘in effect, only another court of the
State.’”281
2. How Should a Federal Court Treat a Federal Opinion on a Matter of State
Law?
Armed with an understanding of a federal court’s task in ascertaining and applying state
law, we are also now able to resolve the problem of the proper weight for subsequent federal
courts to accord federal circuit court precedent in a straightforward manner. This resolution
requires distinguishing between the command of federal stare decisis and that of Erie and its
progeny, including Salve Regina, to decide substantive state-law issues in the same manner as
federal-law ones. First, as we have seen, at any one time, a certain data set of state-law authority
exists, primarily in the form of decisions by state courts. Where these authorities do not
uniformly answer the state-law question posed, it is the task of the federal court to exercise its
own judgment to imagine how the data ought to be connected. This judgment is the court’s
determination of state law.
Second, where the federal court making such a judgment is a circuit court of appeals, its
determination of the issue is a binding determination of state law—that is, of how the data of
state authority ought to be connected. Subsequent circuit court panels and district courts within
the circuit are thereby bound as matters of vertical and horizontal stare decisis, but this binding
effect is no different for state law than it is for federal law. Imagine, for example, that a recent
decision by the Supreme Court arguably leaves open a particular issue, and federal appellate
courts grappling with it have reached varying results. Once a federal circuit court of appeals
opines on the issue, subsequent panels and district courts within the circuit are bound by that
opinion as a matter of federal stare decisis regardless of how sure those other courts are that the
circuit panel interpreted the recent Supreme Court decision erroneously. For this reason, the
commentator who asserted that “federal circuit court determinations of state law have no
precedential value”282 is incorrect. Federal determinations of state law have the same binding
authority on other federal courts as does any other federal determination of law.
For the same reason, however, when a state court renders a decision on a state-law issue
that the federal circuit court has addressed after that federal precedent, the data set for
ascertaining state law has changed, and the federal circuit precedent no longer controls how
circuit panels and district courts resolve the issue. Consider again the relationship of the federal
circuit precedent elaborating on a Supreme Court decision discussed above. If the Supreme
Court subsequently renders another decision that casts doubt on the result of the circuit
precedent, circuit panels and district courts within the circuit are no longer strictly bound by the
circuit precedent. Rather, they must undertake to determine whether the circuit precedent
remains good law in light of the intervening Supreme Court decision. This is because, pursuant
to the vertical structure of the federal courts, circuit and district courts recognize that decisions
by the Supreme Court are superior explications of federal law than are circuit court precedents.
And the foregoing is true regardless of whether the subsequent Supreme Court opinion expressly
identifies the circuit precedent.
A recent Seventh Circuit decision illustrates the analogy. In Taco Bell Corp. v.
Continental Casualty Co.,283 the court once again faced the question whether, under Illinois law,
an insured was entitled to the attorney fees that he incurred in prosecuting a declaratory281
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judgment action against his insurer to establish a breach of the duty to defend—the precise issue
of Illinois law that the Seventh Circuit had addressed in Green. When the court rendered its
decision in Green, Illinois precedent was unsettled. Later, however, “the case on which [the
Seventh Circuit] had relied (Trovillion) was overruled, and it became the unanimous view of that
court that the standard ‘American rule’ should apply to such cases, meaning that there was no
duty of reimbursement unless the insured had only a frivolous defense to the declaratoryjudgment suit, which is not contended here.”284 The Taco Bell court therefore did not follow
Green. Writing for the court, Judge Posner explained: “In light of the Illinois Appellate Court’s
unanimity, the best prediction differs from what it was when Green was decided, and so that
decision is no longer authoritative, just as in a case in which a U.S. Supreme Court decision
shows that a previous decision by a lower court was unsound, even though the Supreme Court
doesn’t mention the decision.”285
The reasoning of Taco Bell makes sense, but the use of the “prediction” metaphor
obscures more than it clarifies. Once the state-authority data set for the state-law issue changed,
the circuit precedent no longer bound other federal courts because that precedent could have
done no more than imagine the state-law rule that connected the various data points that existed
at the time of the federal precedent. Certainly, a subsequent state decision that supports the
federal precedent provides no reason to reexamine that holding.286 But a subsequent state
decision that undermines the federal precedent does provide such a reason because the task for
federal courts is to ascertain and apply state law, and state court decisions must be given proper
regard as indicators of what that law is.287
Although the Taco Bell court was not tripped up by its use of the “prediction” metaphor,
another recent Seventh Circuit panel was. The Seventh Circuit had ruled on a particular aspect
of Illinois law in Currie v. Diamond Mortgage Corp.,288 a 1988 opinion. When, however, that
same question arose before the Southern District of Illinois in a 2003 case, Reiser v. Residential
Funding Corp., “the district judge refused to follow Currie. The judge wrote that he found two
284
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decisions by one of the state’s five intermediate appellate courts more persuasive than Currie and
elected to follow them instead.”289 The Seventh Circuit strongly rebuked the district court: “By
treating Currie as having no more than persuasive force, the district court made a fundamental
error. In a hierarchical system, decisions of a superior court are authoritative on inferior
courts…. [D]istrict judges must follow the decisions of this court whether or not they agree.”290
This rebuke, however, was mistaken. The district judge in Reiser relied in part on an
Illinois appellate opinion that was contrary to Currie and that had been decided after Currie.
Under these circumstances, the district court was not purporting to overrule Currie because that
case was only a binding interpretation of Illinois law as it existed at that time. Rather, the district
court determined, on the basis of subsequent state authority, that Currie no longer accurately
reflected Illinois law. As the Fifth Circuit has put the point: “A panel of this court cannot
‘overturn’ the decision of another panel. In diversity cases, however, we are to follow
subsequent state court decisions that are clearly contrary to a previous decision of this court.
Since [our precedent on Louisiana law] we have received further guidance from the Louisiana
courts.”291
I think the Seventh Circuit’s erroneous approach in Reiser owes primarily to the court’s
misunderstanding of the task of federal courts in ascertaining and applying state law. According
to the court:
A decision by a state’s supreme court terminates the authoritative force of our
decisions interpreting state law, for under Erie our task in diversity litigation is to
predict what the state’s highest court will do. Once the state’s highest court acts,
the need for prediction is past. But the decisions of intermediate state courts lack
similar force; they, too, are just prognostications. They could in principle
persuade us to reconsider and overrule our precedent; assuredly they do not
themselves liberate district judges from the force of our decisions.292
Here, the “prediction” metaphor seems to have confused the court. Decisions of intermediate
state courts are not “just prognostications” of what the state supreme court will do any more than
decisions by federal appellate courts are “just prognostications” of what the federal Supreme
Court will do. Rather, such decisions are valid pronouncements of state law and must be treated
with “proper regard” as such.293 Were it otherwise, none of the Supreme Court’s cases on state
law following Erie would make sense.
A judicial-efficiency policy motivation may also underlie the Reiser court’s
stubbornness. That is, the court values its own precedent and the judicial resources that
following it unthinkingly conserves. The Reiser court stated candidly that its precedent
“represents an educated guess about how the Supreme Court of Illinois will rule. Instead of
guessing over and over again, it is best to stick with one assessment until the state’s supreme
court, which alone can end the guessing game, does so.”294 Sticking with one assessment may be
“best” according to some matrix that the court did not explain, but it is not the proper task for a
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federal court seeking to apply unsettled state law. The Supreme Court case law following Erie
made quite clear that “the state is not without law save as its highest court has declared it”295 and
that a “developing line of authorities [can] cast[] a shadow over the established ones.”296
The Reiser court is not alone in its misunderstanding of the role of federal courts in
applying state law. Concurring in In re Watts, Judge O’Scannlain would have taken the
misguided Reiser approach one step further had he not been constrained by contrary Ninth
Circuit precedent. He opined:
To my mind, a panel must not act in contravention of our precedent without being
highly certain of its authority to do so. And that certainty is not easily obtained
when, as here, the alleged change in state law comes from case law rather than
statutory law. When it is a state statute that has changed, the question is much
simpler, particularly in this age of formal codification…. But with case law,
whether pure common law or judicial glosses on statutory law, the question is
more difficult. We can be certain that state case law is an authoritative expression
of state law only when it comes from the state’s court of last resort. Anything less
leaves room for doubt…. And it seems to me that where there is room for doubt,
we must stay our erasers.297
This view, like that of the Reiser court, is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s post-Erie case
law. Indeed, Judge O’Scannlain’s thought that changes in state law are clearly reflected only by
statutory changes comes perilously close to the Swift v. Tyson regime itself.
IV. CONCLUSION
Confusion regarding the nature of a federal court’s task in ascertaining and applying
unsettled state law may thus lead to opinions that are dubious in light of Erie itself. But much of
the scholarly commentary on this task does not—indeed, cannot—resolve this confusion because
it relies on flawed premises. Erie’s command to apply state law in certain circumstances is not
an invitation for federal courts to instruct their institutionally disadvantaged state brethren on the
proper elaboration of doctrine. That is just formalism. But neither is it an exhortation to refrain
from deciding state-law issues or to institute defendant-friendly policy in the guise of state law.
That position tells us something about its adherents’ views of adjudication, but it does not derive
from federalism, and it is not sustainable in any event.
My argument, rather, has been that federal courts must use their independent judgment in
ascertaining and applying unsettled state law. One aspect of such judgment is undoubtedly
policy. So far as my analysis reveals, however, that aspect cannot be avoided by federal courts,
nor should it. The judgment to be exercised in applying unsettled state law, then, is ultimately
the federal court’s own, and it should exercise its judgment in the best way it can.
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